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International Court of Justice

H0788 - 0002

Notice.

Not to be publicized until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

A ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en session publique et seulement la partie reellement versee au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jener Teil; welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

H0788 - 0003

Ri-Exhibit No 144

C O P Y

296

From the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 140

No. 140 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Thorn, January 2, 1939

The measures of the Polish authorities, such as the many arrests for espionage, the expulsions from the frontier zone, the Agrarian Reform, etc., which are gradually annihilating all that is German here, are accompanied by attacks by Polish associations, which not only are not prevented but are actually tolerated by the State. Such attacks are made on German business establish-ments by the notorious West Marches Society publicly, with the view to destroy these business establishments by boycott.....

von Kuechler

a certified true copy
Dr. Martin Horn
attorney at law

H0788 -0004

Ri-Exhibit No. 145

297

COPY

from the White-Paper No.2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War

No. 142

No. 142 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the Foreign Office

Report

Thorn, January 19,1939

I have lately had repeated occasion to report that the Polish authorities are proceeding rigorously against everything German here. The uniformity of the activity leads one to the conclusion that instructions have been issued by a central authority. The most important incidents recently include action against private individuals, such as expulsions, refusals to extend residence permits, the seizure of the Hostels Association in Graudenz, and the search made at the head office and the local organizations of the Deutsche Vereinigung.

In view of this persecution of everything German, it is no wonder that a desperate feeling has overcome the German population, and that the situation of the Germans here is rightly regarded as more precarious than ever before. The situation of the Germans has become considerably worse, despite the often professed willingness to come to an understanding. This feeling on the part of the German community is naturally leading to a fresh increase in applications for emigration.

von Kuechler

A certified true Copy:

t/ Dr. Horn
s/ Dr. MARTIN HORN
Attorney at Law

H0788 – 0005

Ri-Exhibit No. 146

COPY

298

from the White-Paper No.2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 146

No. 146 The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Foreign Office

Telegram

Warsaw, February 25, 1939

The anti-German demonstration before the Embassy building, reported today by the D.N.B., was the most violent demonstration which has taken place within the last eight years. Not to mention the smashing of a window, the "Rota" song of hate was sung for the first time in front of the Embassy, and for a quarter of an hour alternating choruses uttered cries of: "Down with Hitler," " Away with the German dogs," "Long live Polish Danzig," and "Down with the pro-German policy." The two policemen stationed in front of the Embassy did nothing but merely guard the entrance to the building. It was not until reinforcements of mounted police and three armored cars were called up, that it was possible to clear the streets.

Moltke

A certified true Copy:

s/ Dr. Horn
t/ DR. MARTIN HORN
Attorney at Law

H0788 – 0006

Ri-Exhibit No 147

COPY

299

from the White-Paper No.2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

No. 147

Telegram

Warsaw, February 25, 1939

The renewed demonstration before the Embassy today proceeded in much the same fashion as yesterday's, the only difference being that this time heavy stones were thrown against the building, with the result that one window downstair and two windows upstairs were broken. The police who had been considerably reinforced since yesterday (there were 40 policemen in the immediate neighborhood of the Embassy), remained quite inactive during the entire demonstration, which lasted 15 minutes. The departure of the crowd of 300 people appears to have been effected by means of negotiation. The demonstrators consisted mostly of students belonging to the Radical Party of the Right.

A certified true Copy:

s/ Dr. Horn
t/ DR. MARTIN HORN
Attorney at Law

Ri-Exhibit No. 148 300

COPY

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 151

The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Foreign Office

Report

Warsaw, February 28, 1939

Of the anti-German demonstrations held by the Poles in connection with the Danzig students' conflict the meeting of the Academic Legion, which was held last Sunday in the University of Warsaw, deserves particular mention...Colonel Tomaszewski, whom the Minister of War had appointed chief of the Academic Legion, delivered a passionate address to the students, in which he appealed to their patriotic spirit and urged them to make sacrifices; he managed to weave in at various points political attacks, which were in part expressly directed against Germany, in part meant for Germany, and were interpreted in that spirit by his hearers. Poland, he declared, had no reason to return any territory, but on the contrary had more than one territorial demand to make (cries of: Polish Danzig! Polish East Prussia!). Danzig, continued Tomaszewski, was a festering sore on the body of Poland, which must be lanced.....

von Moltke

A certified true copy:

Dr. Martin HORN
Attorney at Law

H0788-0007

Ti-Exhibit No. 149.

H0788 - 0008

COPY

from the White-Paper No.2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

301

No. 200

Conversation of the Fuehrer with M. Beck, Polish Foreign Minister - in the Presence of the German Foreign Minister, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, and the Polish Ambassador in Berlin - Berchtesgaden, January 5, 1939.

Memorandum of Dr. Schmidt, Minister Plenipotentiary

In opening his remarks, M. Beck stressed the fact that the September crisis of German Polish relations had stood the test without a sign of strain. It might be that the high level of the relations last September had shown some falling off in the last few months, but, in the opinion of the Polish Government, both parties should exert themselves to remove the causes of certain difficulties which had arisen in the immediate past. M. Beck mentioned the Danzig question as one of the difficulties; he emphasized the fact that, in this case, no only the German and the Polish Governments were concerned, but also third parties, among others the League of Nations. What would be the proper course, for instance, if the League of Nations were to give up its role in Danzig? There were several other questions in which existing misunderstandings ought to be eliminated. One of these was the guarantee of the Czechoslovakian frontier: Should it be taken in hand immediately? Or, if at all, for what time was it contemplated? Poland was especially interested in the Carpath-Ukrainian question. He would remind them of Marshal Pilsudski's words about the "Balkanizing of Central Europe." In the agitators now active in the Carpath-Ukrainian region, Poland recognized old enemies in a new guise. She feared that the Carpath-Ukraine might one day grow into such a centre of unrest for Poland that the Polish Government might find themselves called upon to intervene. This might result in further complications. That had been the chief reason for Poland's efforts to attain a joint frontier with Hungary.

The Fuehrer replied that a settlement of all existing difficulties could be obtained only by a return to the fundamental spirit of German-Polish relations. As for Germany, he could say emphatically that her relations to Poland were embodied in the Non-Aggression Pact o 1934, and had not changed in the slightest since then. In the question of the Carpatho-Ukraine particularly, Germany had no interests on the other side of the Carpathians, and was indifferent as to what interested countries did there. The attitude adopted by Germany on the Ukrainian question in the Vienna Arbitration - an attitude which had perhaps led to certain misunderstandings - was explicable in terms of historical development of the question. This arbitral award had been put into execution on the basis of the Hungarian demands after both parties had been heard. His (the Fuehrer's) desire to avoid anything which might precipitate an international conflict was the determining factor in his attitude on the Ukrainian question. Poland need have no fear that Germany had any such motives as were attributed to her in the international press.

With respect to the details of German-Polish relations, he wished once more to repeat that there had been no change in the German attitude towards Poland since 1934. To attain a final adjustment of the questions still pending between the two countries, one should not confine oneself to the rather negative Agreement of 1934, but should seek to formulate a treaty which would cover these single problems and dispose of them. For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would be settled in a manner consonant with German views (for it looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to co-operate in finding a sensible solution), but there was also

the problem of Danzig and the Corridor, a problem that directly affected German-Polish relations. The fact that Germany felt so keenly on this matter made it extremely difficult to find a solution. In his opinion it was necessary to get out of the old grooves, and to seek a solution on completely novel lines. In the case of Danzig, for instance, one could imagine an arrangement by which, in conformity with the will of its inhabitants, the city should be reincorporated into the German body politic, but by which, as a matter of course, Polish interests would be safeguarded in every respect, particularly in the economic sphere. That indeed was in the interests of Danzig, for economically Danzig could not exist without a hinterland: therefore, the Fuehrer had in mind a formula by which Danzig would return to Germany politically, but would remain with Poland economicall;

302 + 303

Danzig was German, would always remain German, and sooner or later would return to Germany.

As for the Corridor, which, as already mentioned, presented a grave psychological problem for Germany, the Fuehrer pointed out that the connectio with East Prussia was as vital a matter for the Reich as the connection with the sea was for Poland. Here too it might be possible to find, by the use of quite novel methods, a solution that would pay due regard to the interests of both.

If means could be found to bring about a final settlement of all separate questions on such a common sense footing, whereby each partner, of course, would have to be given his full rights, then that would be the time to supplement the rather negative Declaration of 1934 by a somewhat more positive arrangement with Poland, somewhat like the agreements with France; Germany would give Poland a definite guarantee of her frontiers on a treaty basis. Poland would then have the great advantage of getting her German frontiers, including the boundaries of the Corridor, assured by treaty. The Fuehrer, in saying this, stressed once more the psychological difficulty of the Corridor problem, and the fact that only he was in a position to engineer such a solution. It was not entirely a simple matter for him to guarantee the Corridor in this way, and he would certainly meet with considerable criticism in consequence, especially from the bourgeoisie. But as a practical politician, he nevertheless believed that such a solution would be best. Once Germany had given her guarantee, one would hear as little about the Polish Corridor as one now heard about the South Tyrol or Alsace-Lorraine.

The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked the Fuehrer for his exposition of the German standpoint, and declared that Poland, too, would abide absolutely by the attitude she had maintained towards Germany till the

Poland would continue the line of independent policy she had pursued in former years, when an attempt was made to link Poland more closely with Russia by means of an Eastern Pact. Poland, however, was not as nervous as France about increasing her security, and she placed no trust in so-called "security systems". Their final failure after the September crisis marked a turning-point in history. But Poland could thoroughly appreciate the German point of view as expressed once more in the declaration just made by the Fuehrer. For her part she would hold fast to the old policy towards Germany.

As to German-Polish relations, he took cognizance of the wishes uttered by the Fuehrer. Nevertheless the Danzig question appeared to him extraordinarily difficult. In this connection one had to take public opinion in Poland into special account. By this he did not mean the attitude of "the coffee-house opposition." During his seven years in offic he had never paid the least attention to coffee-house opinion, and he was still in office. But he had to consider the real opinion of the nation, and this did seem to present difficulties for a solution of the Danzig question Nevertheless, he was quite ready to think the matter over.

Colonel Beck did not enter into the other German-Polish questions broached by the Fuehrer, but concluded his remarks with a renewed confirmation of his statement that Poland's general attitude would remain true as ev to the line followed since 1934.

Schmidt.

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Ti-Exhibit No. 149 Contd

Certified True Copy.

M. Horn.

H0788 - 0009

Ti- Exhibit No. 150.

COPY

304

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

No. 201

Conversation Between the German Foreign Minister and M. Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, Munich, January 6, 1939.

Memorandum

Berlin, January 9, 1939 .

At the beginning of a conversation lasting about an hour and a half M. Beck immediately broached the Danzig problem. He said that Poland, too, was endeavoring to continue neighborly relations with Germany, and to strengthen them. The only problem which might shortly prove a disturbing factor here was the Danzig question. He saw two possible circumstances that might force us to a definite stand on the subject:

1. That the League of Nations would cease to interest itself in the Danzig question and would recallthe High Commissioner, in which case Germany and Poland would have to settle the question between themselves.

2. That the Poles would be compelled to take up the matter owing to new developments in Danzig.

He added that the problem was a very difficult one indeed, and that he had cudgelled his brains for a solution, but without result so far.

Finally, M. Beck pointed out once more that, in the minds of the entire Polish people, Danzig was the touchstone of German-Polish relations, and that it would take a good deal to alter that idea.

In reply I made the following explanations to M. Beck:

1. As the Fuehrer had already said, Germany's prime andunqualified desire was for a final, comprehensive and generous consolidation of our mutual relations.

2. Two problems seemed to have important bearing on this point:

(a) Direct German-Polish relations. In this connection I would suggest the following solution:-

Reunion of Danzig with Germany. In return for this, all Polish economic interests in this territory to be guaranteed in the most generous manner. Connection between Germany and her province of East Prussia by means of an extra-territorial motor-road and railway. Germany, for her part, to guarantee the Corridor and all Poland's present possessions i.e., to give final and permanent recognition of the common frontiers.

(b) The Czecho-Carpatho-Ukrainian question.

In this connection I repeated that ethnographic frontiers had been fixed at Munich. Should the principle of political frontiers be brought up by any one, of course, Germany could not remain disinterested. Although German political interests did not, in themselves, extend beyond the Carpathians, Germany considered it impossible to declare her disinterestedness in any alteration of frontiers, even beyond that carried out in regard to Czechoslovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine, because such events might easily involve her in a conflict. The decision arrived at by the arbiters in Vienna must be observed, and it was our fundamental conception that, if any other wishes came up for consideration here, they would have to be brought into accord with German

H0788-0010

interests.

At the close of the conversation I complhained to M. Beck about the treatment of our German minorities, especially in the Olsa territory, and took occasion to object most emphatically to M. Grazynski's continued anti-German intrigues. M. Beck assured me that this question had already received seriosu attention and that he, for his part, would do his utmost to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs.

I then thanked M. Beck forhis invitation to Warsaw, and accepted it on principle. The date has not yet been fixed. It was agreed that M. Beck and I should once more turn over in our minds the whole matter of a treaty settlement between Germany and Poland. Lipski and Moltke could then carry on negotiations during the next few weeks, and my visit should certainly take place this winter.

von Ribbentrop

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Certified True Copy.

M. Horn.

H0788 - 0011

H0788 - 0012

151
Ri-Exhibit No. 150..

306 - 07

COPY

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

No. 170

The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Foreign Office

Report

Warsaw, May 30, 1938

The anticipation that the position of the German minority in Poland would be materially by the Joint Declaration of November 5, 1937, by the German and Polish Governments, concerning the treatment of their respective minorities, has unfortunately not been realized.

On all these subjects I have constantly made emphatic representations to the Polish Government, and I am continuing to do so, because so far the Polish Government have met hardly any of our wishes. In this connection I have again and again pointed out that the fate of the German minority in Poland fills us with anxienty, and that the constant discrimination against the German minority in Poland must of necessity have an adverse effect upon our neighborly relations. According to my instructions, I have drawn attention to the fact that everywhere in the Reich the Polish minority are earning their livelihood, whereas the Germans in Poland, despite the economic improvement recognizable there, are deprived of their economic basis solely on account of their Germanism. Apart from this, the best proof of our readiness to deal with complaints affecting the minorities is our proposal, repeatedly made to the Polish Government, to arrange for periodic discussions between German and Polish experts, a suggestion which the Polish Government, unfortunately, has not acted upon so far.

s/ von MOLTKE

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ Dr. MARTIN HORN

Attorney at Law

H0788 - 0013

Ri-Exhibit No 152

308

COPY

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

No 178

The German Minister for Home Affairs to the Foreign Office

Berlin, March 4, 1939

The negotiations on the minorities questions, which were begun under my direction with representatives of the Polish Government on February 27, were concluded yesterday.

The negotiations have unfortunately had a wholly unsatisfactory result. The Poles have no intention of changing their policy towards the German minority in any way. In some less important matters, they may be ready to make small concessions; but in the really vital questions concerning the German minority, they are determined vigorously to continue their policy of de-Germanization.

By Order

Vollert

A certified true copy:

s/ Dr. HORN

t/ DR. MARTIN HORN

Attorney at Law

H0788 - 0014

Ri-Exhibit No. 153

309

COPY

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 152

Conversation Between the German Foreign Minister and the Polish Ambassador

Memorandum

Berlin, February 28, 1939

I received the Polish Ambassador today and told him that I regarded with ever increasing concern the development in Poland arising out of the local student incidents in Danzig...He, Lipski, knew the fundamental attitude of the Fuehrer, who desired to arrive at a far-reaching and definite arrangement with Poland, and knew that this attitude remained unchanged. By such regrettable incidents, however, this arrangement would certainly be rendered very difficult, or at least would be considerably delayed.

von Ribbentrop

A certified true copy:

Dr. Martin HORN
Attorney at Law

Ti- Exhibit No. 154.

COPY

310

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of War.

No. 203

Conversation of the German Foreign Minister With the Polish Ambassador, March 21, 1939.

Memorandum

I requested M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, to come to see me at noon today. I described to him the development of the Czechoslovakian question, and declared that, in view of the precipitate nature of the events, it had not been possible for me to keep the foreign representatives here as well informed as I should have wished. I had, however, fully informed Ambassador von Moltke, who happened to be in Berlin, and instructed him to enlighten M. Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs. I then described in detai the events which had induced the Fuehrer to intervene.

It had, I said, attracted our notice that the Benes spirit was astir again in what remained of Czechoslovakia. All the Fuehrer's warnings to M. Chvalkovsky had gone unheeded. The Prague Government had recently tried to take dictatorial action in Carpatho-Ukraine andSlovakia. Moreover, the oppression of Germans in the linguistic enclaves had begun again.

I presumed that the settlement of the Carpatho-Ukrainian question, whic had meantime been reached, had caused great satisfaction in Poland. The establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia meant the final pacification of this area in conformity with historical principles, and woul eventually prove of benefit to all.

Ambassador Lipski then expressed anxiety with regard to Germany's havi taken over the protection of Slovakia. This news had created a strong impression in Poland, for the man in the street could not help regarding such a step as one directed primarily against Poland. The Slovaks, he said were a people linguistically related to the Poles. Polish interests in tha area were also historically justified, and, from a purely realistic politic point of view, it had to be admitted that the proclamation of the Protector could be regarded only as a blow at Poland.

I drew Ambassador Lipski's attention to the fact that the independent Slovak Government had appealed to Germany for protection. The proclamation of the Protectorate was certainly not directed against Poland. I gave him understand clearly that the question might be discussed jointly if German-Polish relations in general were to develop satisfactorily; in that event, a Polish participation in the guarantee of the Slovak State might be considered. I said that I had unfortunately been compelled to recognize that a certain constraint had gradually manifested itself in German-Polish relations. This development had begun several months ago. Surprise had been felt in Germany at the peculiar attitude displayed by Poland in the Minorities Commission. The Danzig incidents provoked by Polish students h likewise given us food for thought. Ambassador Lipski denied emphatically that that sort of incident had been caused by Polish students. He likewis denied most vigorously my observation that, in the Fuehrer's opinion, the posters which had led to the incidents had been put up by Polish students, and maintained that Polish students had not participated in the affair in any way.

I further drew the Polish Ambassador's attention to the continuous press attacks, to the anti-German demonstrations on the occasion of Count Ciano's visit, and to the open press feud now being carried on. This pre campaign seemed to me entirely unjustified. I said that the Fuehrer had

H0788-0015

always worked for mutual accord and understanding with Poland. The 311
Fuehrer was still pursuing this aim, but was increasingly surprised at the
Polish attitude. Up to now I had imposed a certain restraint upon the 312
German press with regard to Poland, as the Polish Ambassador could see for
himself by glancing at the German newspapers. In the long run, however, it
would be impossible for me to allow such attacks to go unanswered. The
probable result of such a reciprocal press campaign would be that our
relations would reach the zero point. I stated that it seemed necessary to
me to make a fresh attempt to put German-Polish policy on the right track,
and that it appeared to me right and proper that a personal discussion
between German and Polish statesmen should take place at an early date.

I added that I should be glad if Foreign Minister Beck would visit
Berlin in the near future. The Fuehrer had told me that he too would warmly
welcome such a discussion. Concerning the possible subject of such an
exchange of views, I declared to M. Lipski that he had to admit that Germany
was not without a share in the creation and present existence of Poland,
and that Poland owed her present territorial expanse to Germany's greatest
misfortune: namely, the fact that Germany had lost the World War.

The decision regarding the Corridor, I said, was generally accepted as
being the heaviest burden placedon Germany by the Peace Treaty of Versailles.
No former government could have dared to renounce German claims to revision
without finding themselves swept away by the Reichstag within the space of
forty-eight hours. The Fuehrer thought otherwise with regard tothe
Corridor problem. He recognized the justice of the Polish demand for free
access to the sea. He was the only German statesman who could venture to
renounce possession of the Corridor once and for all. The prerequisite was,
however, that the purely German city of Danzig should return to theReich, and
that an extra-territorial motor-road and railway connection be established
between the Reich and East Prussia. The existence of the Corridor was
a thorn in the flesh of the German people, of which the sting could only be
removed in this way. If the Polish statesmen were to take the real facts
into account calmly, a solution could be found on the following basis: -
the return of Danzig, to the Reich, an extra-territorial motor-road and
railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia, and, in return, a
guarantee of the Corridor. I could well imagine that, in such a case, the
Slovakian question might be dealt with in the aforementioned manner.

Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly, and then to
give me an answer.

I suggested that Ambassador Lipski go to Warsaw to report in person.
I repeated once more how advantageous a final settlement between Germany and
Poland appeared to me, particularly at the present juncture. This was also
important because up to now the Fuehrer could not but be astonished at the
peculiar attitude adopted by Poland on a number of questions. It was
important that he should not gain the impression that Poland simply did not
want to reach a settlement.

von Ribbentrop

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Certified True Copy.

M. Horn.

H0788 - 0016

Ti-Exhibit No. 155

COPY

3 | 3

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 204

The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Foreign Office.

Telegram

Warsaw, March 24, 1939.

Definitely confirmed that three or four classes of reservists, i.e., 1911-1914, also 1906 and 1907 were called up on short notice from different districts. Reserve officers of technical troops called up.

Moltke

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Certified True Copy.

M. Horn.

H0788 - 0017

H0788 - 0018

Ri - Exhibit No 156

COPY

3 / 4

From the White-paper No 2 : Documents on the Events preced the Outbreak of War.

No 206

The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the Foreign Office.

Telegram

(Translation)

Warsaw, March 24, 193

The calling up of reserves already reported points to the growing influence of military circles upon the condu of Polish foreign policy. For the time being, the Foreign Minister is still in a strong position as is evident from the arrest of Mackiewicz, a prominent editor, who, althoug an adherent of Pilsudski's, has become a bitter opponent of M. Beck. It is to be feared, however, that M. Beck will adopt a more extreme course if the threatening wave of Nationalist feeling compels him to do so.

As to British suggestions, which have motivated the British Ambassador's repeated calls at the Foreign Ministry during the past few days, nothing definite has so far become known. Therefore it is impossible to say whether Polish mobilization measures were influenced by this British action or not. A remark made by L. Arciszewski, Under-Secretary of State, to some diplomats here, seems worth repeating in this connection. Amid various deprecatory remarks about Britain and France, who without running any risks themselves, had attempted time and again to utilize Poland for ends other than her own, he declared that Poland would never fight merely for the interests of others Powers. In other respects

H0788 - 0019

too, it may be inferred from the general lines of M. Beck' policy that Poland would only reluctantly join any general combination, or allow herself to be involved in actions which would compel her to define her position prematurely and openly. This does not mean, of course, that Poland would not accept British proposals if, as a result of the present negociations, she saw a possibility of obtaining firm promises from Great Britain, which would augment her security.

Moltke

Certify true copy,
Signed : Dr Martin Horn
Attorney at law.

Suite Exhibit No 156 a.

H0788-0020

Ri. Exhibit No. 157

3 / 5

Copy

from White Paper Nr. 2

Documents concerning the antecedents of the war

Nr. 438

Statement by the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 10 July 1939

Paragr.3 ..... Certain defensive measures were taken by Poland on the 23rd March and the reply was sent to Berlin on the 26th March. I ask the House to note carefully these dates. It has been freely stated in Germany that it was His Majesty's Government's guarantee which encouraged th Polish Government to take the action which I have described. But it will be observed that our guarantee was not given until the 31st March. By the 26th March no mention of it, even, had been made to the Polish Government.

.....

A certified true copy:

Dr. Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0021

Ri. Exhibit No.158

T r a n s c r i p t

from the W h i t e B o o k No.2

Documents on History preceding the War

316

No.271

From the speech of the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax in the House of Lords, 20 March 1939

(Translation)

.....But when the time comes for the states to see clearly that a guarantee against consecutive aggressions apparently does not exist, aggressions which are directedadvsiagcessively against those who stand in way of ambitions for plans of world domination, then the scales move in the opposite direction immediately and one presumably would find in all respective circles a far greater readines to take into consideration whether, for mutual support's sake, the acceptance of enduring and mutual obligations should not seem advisable even, if only for reasons of the necessity of self-defense. His Majesty's Government has not failed to learn a lesson from these events and did not waste any time but had close and practical conferences not only with the Dominions but also with other Governments involved in these questions which so suddenly had become of a public nature...

Copy certified by:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney at Law.

H0788 - 0022

Ri. Exhibit No. 159

From:

Documents on German Politics, Volume 7 I

317

Footnote to:

Conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador Lipsky in Berlin of 26 March 1939.

Page 102/103

.....

On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw as well as in Paris and Moscow that a "formal declaration" by the English, French, Russian and Polish Governments shall be made through which the beginning of immediate negotiations concerning measures of common resistance against any kind of threat to the independence of any European state was to be an ced. Immediately after the delivery of this declaration the signatory powers "would begin to examine that particular situation which should requ such an examination and start establishing the kind of measures that perh were to be taken." But in the meantime the British plan met with some res stance. Primeminister Chamberlain, therefore, explained an interpellation by the House of Commons on 23 March: "I am not yet in a position to give a report on the negotiations with other governments which took place as a result of the recent events." Furthermore, on 24 March the German Ambassa in Warsaw, von Moltke, reported of "repeated calls of the British Ambassa on the local Foreign Office." The Polish Government, which ordered parti mobilization on 23 March was in no way satisfied with this British propos for negotiations, but demanded far more concrete commitments on behalf of England in respect to Poland. Therefore, also on 23 March the Minister fo Foreign Affairs, Beck, instructed the Polish Ambassador in London, Count Edward Raczynsky to submit to the British Government the following propos of an

H0788 – 0023

English-Polish union:

"Referring to the English proposal of 21 March I request of you to ask Lord Halifax if:

1) In view of the difficulties, and the unavoidable complications, and the ensuing loss of time, brought about by multilateral negotiations,

2) In view of the rapid course of events which from one day to the next co make necessary a friendly understanding on the coordination of mutual opinions and mutual actions, the British Government could not consider the possibility of reaching with us without delay a bilateral agreement in line with the proposed declaration.

I presume that such an understanding would not influence unfavorably the future fate of a general debate. But it would give us immediately an advantageous basis for collaboration in different fields which, at present, contain dang

Today I conversed with the local Ambassador of England, (Sir Howard Kennar concerning the idea of such an agreement, adding that we had a treaty of allia with France of 1921 (Febr.19), and that the English on their part had their agreement with Paris, so that in case of an agreement between both of our Governments should come into realization, we would not find ourselves in contradiction with either the Polish or the English policy in regard to France. I also share the opinion that the French Government should be informed confidentially about decisions we eventually may arrive at.

If the British Government happens to agree on principle we would be able to work out very rapidly the form and

H0788 - 0024

contents of such an eventual agreement or gentlemen's agreement." 319

This proposal of an English-Polish alliance was submitted by Count Raczynski on 24 March to the British Minister for Foreign Affairs Lord Halifax .....

Copy certified by:

/s/ Dr. Horn

Attorney-at-Law.

H0788 - 0025

Ri Exhibit Nr.160

C o p y

from the W h i t e B o o k Nr. 2

Documents on the History preceding the War

320

Nr. 279

Commentary of the British Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 31 March 1939

(Translation)

As I mentioned this morning, His Majesty's Government has no official proof for the rumors of any planned attack on Poland. Therefore, it must not be taken for granted that the Government considers these rumors to be true.

I gladly take this opportunity to explain again the general policy of our government: His Majesty's Government, by way of open discussions between the parties concerned, - continously stood for settling of any difficulties that may arise among them. It considers that as a natural and appropriate way wher differences exist. According to its opinion there should be no question whic could not be solved by peaceful means and it therefore could not find any justification whatsoever if force, or the threat of force, were employed in place of the methods of negotiations.

As is known to the House, at present certain conferences take place wit other governments. In order to clarify fully the attitude of His Majesty's Government, in the meantime, before those conferences are concluded, I have inform the House that, in case that during this period any action should tak place which clearly threatens Polands independence,- and which, therefore, is considered by the Polish Government as so vitally important that it would put up resistance against it with her nations armed forces,- then His Majesty's Government would consider it its duty to lend immediately all possibl aid within its power to the Polish Government. It gave the Polish Government such an assurance.

H0788 - 0026

I may add that the French Government authorized me to declare that concerning this question it has the same attitude as His Majesty's Government.

Copy certified by:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn

t/ Dr, Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788 – 0027

Ri. Exhibit Nc 161

322

C c p y

frcm the White-Bcck Nc. 3

Pclish Dccuments cn the Histcry precedi g the War

Nc. 12

Repcrt by the Pclish mbassadcr in Lcndcn, Ccunt Edward Raczinski, tc the Pclish Minister fcr Fcreign ffairs in Warsaw, cf March 29, 1939

Embassy cf the
Republic cf Pcland
ER/MR-Nc. 1WB/tj/146

Lcndcn, March 29, 1939

confidential:

Tc His Excellency

the Minister fcr Fcreign ffairs

in Warsaw

Pclitical Repcrt nc. 7/1

The attitude cf the British Gcvernment tc the crisis. Relaticns with Pcland. Cnversatic n with mbassadcr Kennedy.

The viclent ccurse cf the last stages cf the Czech crisis has deeply shccked public cpinicn in this ccuntry. change in the attitude cf this ccuntry's Gcvernment has alsc taken place. Fcr the strcng cppenents cf Hitler Germany these last events merely cnfirmed that which was tc be expected and are anctber prccf that energetic measures are necessary. The cvents in Czecho Slcvakia gained in impcrtance by virtue cf the impressicn they made in the lccal "Recnciliatic n Camp."

Supprters in this particular camp usually avcided giving hcnest publicity tc their expectaticns. They generally limited themselves tc stating that Great Britain must cnfine herself tc defending Western Eurcpe and naturally the British Empire and Imperial lines cf cmmunicatic n as well. Central and Eastern Eurcpe cn the cther hand were tc serve as German expansicnist territcries frcm which Great Britain cculd withcut any particular harm tc herself.

H0788 - 0028

No loudly-voiced arguments, but perhaps none the less important as emanating from this camp, could be seen in the expectation that it would prove difficult for Germany to manage the territories ceded to her; thanks to these difficulties and her antagonism towards Russia, Germany would lose her powers of expansion and dynamic momentum. It was anticipated that war between Russia and Germany would follow, which would weaken both sides, not without indirect advantage to the Western Powers.

The rapid march of events which, without spilling a drop of blood, brought valuable booty to Germany, showed at the same time the weak points of this argument. This development pointed to the fact that it was essentially an excuse which enabled the responsible statesmen of the Western Powers to follow the line of least resistance. Serious misapprehension was felt at the fact that Germany, instead of experiencing any loss, should have gained additional strength in the East

This fact was responsible for an entirely new attitude towards Germany. It found its expression in the political press of Great Britain, which strictly conformed, moreover, to Government policy. According to exchanges of news in local diplomatic and political circles, the transformation in this so-called "Reconciliation Camp" is by no means complete. It is generally assumed that Sir John Simon belongs to this group. He is considered to be the author of a proposed common declaration by Great Britain, France, Poland and the Soviet Union. Even the Prime Minister, despite the energetic tone of his last speeches, does not appear to be free from doubt as to whether he would be the winner in the game started in Munich.

This state of uncertainty seems to apply primarily to England's relations with Poland. In the theory of defeatism or even reconciliation, referred to above there was seemingly no clearly defined room for us. Nowadays, having regard to these rapid German successes-obtained only by pressure - the belief is gaining ground in London that Poland also will finish up with a compromise with Germany - which would in turn enable her to bring about a rapid disintegration of Russia. People became concerned at the thought

H0788 – 0029

that the course of such a development might eventually affect the West, in which case the German pressure would prove irresistible. This conclusion would lead to the assumption that Anglo-Polish relations were likely to become closer. Apart from this, another serious reason has asserted itself to link up Great Britain's policy with ours: This was the realization that was gradually forming that Poland was probably the only factor in Eastern Europe, apart from Soviet Russia, possessing full political independence and exernal and internal relationships which permit of independent decisions. The school of thought of those in favour of "reconciliation" strives, as is well known, for a limitation of British influence in the eastern Mediterranean and in the defense of the Dardanelles, which safeguard the entrance to the Black Sea. Meanwhile it has been ascertained that in the Balkan Peninsula, that is to say the gateway to Turkey, a situation existed which was not free from menace, and the political mobilization of the states belonging to the Balkan Entente in accordance with the desire and under the direction of Great Britain would meet with great difficulties. Out of all the possibilities mentioned above and others which for lack of space I pass over theBritish Government chose the proposal of a common declaration by themselves, France, Poland and the Soviet Union for the purpose of approaching us. As there were, however, until recently, ragular differences of opinion and doubts within the Government itself regarding the expediency of these active measures, the not very energetic and consequently less binding form of a general declaration was chosen, couched in such terms as permitted of many interpretations. Proof that the internal weakness resulting from this is well understood here, was forthcoming in the circumstance that the attitude of Poland, which was opposed to the signature of such a document, reduced no great astonishment in London; far less was there any claim to conduct Polish policy.

Yet another circumstance calls for explanation, in so far as it is possible for me to give one at this moment, i. e. the present state of Anglo-Russian relations. As already reported to Your Excellency on the occasion of the departure of Mr. Hudson for Warsaw and Moscow No. 57/tj/122 dated 9th inst here in England great hopes were placed upon possible political co-operation with the Soviets. On the Soviet sidd there was a decided lack of enthusiasm. At that time the Soviets declared themselves ready to sign

a common declaration. They did that under conditions which until now have not been fully clarified. Apparently they made their signature conditional upon Poland's participation.

It is not known whether the British Government approached Moscow in regard to a triple signature including France and whether they were not prepared to do so. In any case there have been numerous indications recently which go to show that in connection with the British initiative, the relationship is less cordial than a very short time ago. I shall be reverting to this matter in my report of the conversation with Ambassador Kennedy. I would like simply to add here that Mr. Mi[illegible]ky, the Ambassador, whom I often met at of President Lebrun, scarcely concealed the fact that he was extremely pleased with the course events had taken; at the same time he showed a good deal of self-confidence. The element of hesitation in the Governemtn here became more marked on the recruitment question which for months past has been the object of heate controversy. In view of the fairly large increase in the strength of the regular a the territorial army, the local experts explain the disinclination of the Governme to bring in the Conscription Bill on technical grounds. They declare that this measure would have a symbolic and demonstrative meaning for the near future, but would not facilitate the building up of the army in peacetime.

Apart from the values of these declarations, the wavering of MR. Chamberlain seems primarily to proceed from his unwillingness to bring the Trade Unions, who were opposed to conscription, into conflict with him and thus produce differences of opinion in Parliament, which was now almost of one opinion. Instead of introducing the Conscription Bill, the Premier provisionally announced in the House of Commons an increase of the local territorial army up to a total of 340,000 men.

My conversation with Ambassador Kennedy.

This view of the local situation was the main subject of a conversation which I had on the 28th inst. with the American Ambassador, Mr. Kennedy, and the substance of which I dummunicated in accordance with Your Excellency's wishes to Director Lubienski. I asked Mr. Kennedy point blank as to the conversation

H0788 - 0030

H0788 - 0031

he is said to have had recently with Mr. Chamberlain about Poland. Mr. Kennedy was surprised at my question and denied categorically that any such conversation of particular importance had taken plade. At the same time, and to some extent contradicting his previous statement, Mr. Kennedy expressed his annoyance that his colleagues in Paris and Warsaw "who had not such good opportunities as he had of forming an exact picture of the situation in Britain were nevertheless so ready to talk about it.

As I saw that this way would not get me much further, I turned the conversation to the momentary situation and tried to get the Ambassador to express an opinion on Britain's readiness to take up arms. I have already sent Your Excellency a telegraphic report about this part of my conversation. Mr. Kennedy, who indicated that his view was based on a number of talks with authoritative circles here, declared his conviction that if Poland should decide to engage in armed conflict with Germany, especially in regard to Danzig, Britain would be drawn into the war. This as Mr. Kennedy expressly emphasized, would not be because Britain felt more friendly towards us now than hitherto, nor would it be the result of a decision made particularly willingly or with great satisfaction, it would be the outcome of political necessity. If, in the other hand, Poland should remain undecided, then in the Ambassador's opinion, the conciliatory elements in the Government would use the opportunity to persuade Great Britain to desist from obligations which bound her to us. Mr. Kennedy thinks that the present Government is still in doubt as to whether Poland has really irrevocably decided to oppose all efforts to acquire Danzig. At the speed with which conditions change over here, such assurances should of necessity be frequently repeate

I then touched upon the Russian question. Mr. Kennedy was reserved in his replies and evidently had no desire to be drawn into a discussion of British procedure with regard to Moscow (nor of the difficulties which might beset this procedure?) He confined himself to the characteristic utterance that the British Goverhment attached far more imprtance to Anglo-Polish co-operation

H0788 - 0032

than to Anglo-Russian. This de-operation in any case represented an important initial stage for Britain's further procedure.

So much I heard from Mr. Kennedy himself. On the other hand, rumours are current in local journalistic circles that the Ambassador actually discussed the Eastern European situation with the Prime Minister a few days ago. On this occasion, he is said to have emphasized the fact that in the event of a conflict, America's sympathies for Britain would to a large extent depend on the decisive support lent by Great Britain to the countries threatened by Germany.

Edward Raczynski

Ambassador of the Republic of Poland

Copy certified by:

s/ Dr. Martin Horn

t/ Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law

H0788-0033

COPY

328

From the White-paper No 2,: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 208

Conversation of the German Foreign Minister With the Polish Ambassador, March 26,1939.

Memorandum

(Translation)

I received M Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, at 12.30 p.m. today.

Ambassador Lipski handed me the Polish Government' memorandum here enclosed, which I read in his presence,

Having taken note of its contents I replied to Ambassador Lipski that, in my personal opinion, the Polish attitude could not be considered a suitable basis for a solution of the German-Polish question. The only possible solution of the problem was the reunion of Dantzig with the Reich and the construction of an extra-territorial motor-road and railway connection between the Reich and East Prussia. M. Lipski replied that it was his painful duty to draw attention to the fact any further pursuance of these German plans, especially where the return of Danzig to the Reich was concerned meant war with Poland.

I then drew Ambassador Lipski's attention to the reports in hand respecting the concentration of Polish troops, and warned him of the possible consequence. The Polish attitude seemed to me a peculiar reply to my recent

H0788 - 0034

offer of a final adjustement of German-Polish relations If things continued like this a serious situation might soon arise. I was in a position to tell Ambassador Lipski that such action as, for example, a violation of Danzig territory by Polish troops, would be regarded by Germany in the same light as a violation of the frontiers of the Reich.

Ambassador Lipski emphatically denied that Poland had any military designs upon Danzig. The movements of military units carried out by Poland were merely precautionary measures.

I then asked Ambassador Lipski whether the Polish Government would not reconsider the German proposals as soon as the situation had become somewhat calmer, so that a solution might be reached on the basis we proposed, namely the re-union of Danzig with the Reich and an extra-territorial motor-road and railway connection. Ambassador Lipski gave an evasive answer and referred once more to the Memorandum he had handed me.

I replied to Ambassador Lipski that I would first of all report to theFuehrer. My chief concern was to prevent the Fuehrer from gaining the impression that Polwn simply did not want to come to an understanding.

Ambassador Lipski asked me to have the problem studied once more in all its aspects by the German authorities. He would decide whether there might not be prospects of reaching a solution on the basis of the Polish ideas. He added that Foreign Minister Beck, following our suggestion, would be glad to visit Berlin, but it seemed to him that all questions inwolved should be adequately prepared by diplomatic methods.

Suite Exhibit No 162 a.

H0788 - 0035

330

At the close of our conversation I make it absolute clear to Ambassador Lipski that in my opinion the Polish proposals could not be regarded by the Fuehrer as satisfactory. According to the German conception, only the unconditional return of Danzig to the Reich, an extra-territoria connection with East Prussia, a 25 years non-aggression pac with frontier guarantees, and co-operation in the Slovakian question, in the form of a joint protection of this territo to be undertaken by the adjoining states, could lead to a final settlement

von Ribbentrop.

Certify true copy,
Signed :

Dr Martin H o r n
Attorney at law.

Suite Exhibit 162 b.

H0788 - 0036

Appendix.

Memorandum

I

331

Today, as always the Polish Government attach th greatest importance to the maintenance of neighborly rela with the German Reich for the longest possible period of time.

As long ago as 1933, the Polish Government gave clear proof of their attitude in that they were among the first of the foreign Governments to pave the way for friendly relations with the Third Reich and in that they entered into negociations which led to the German-Polish Declaration of January 26, 1934 .

The positive attitude adopted by Poland toward the National Socialist Senate in Danzig should also be mentioned here.

During the ensuing five years the Polish Government had never allowed their international political activity to involve them in any action directed against German Reich.

Finally, it is a well-known fact that, in the autumn of 1938, Poland's determined attitude contributed very considerably to the prevention of an armed conflict in connection with the realization of the German demands.

II

In the matter of through-traffic between Germany and East Prussia as well as in the matter of the Free City of Danzig, on which the two Governments have, so far, always come to an understanding, and in respect of which the German Government have now made new suggestions the Polish Government have adopted the following attitude

H0788 - 0037

(a) The Polish Government have no interest in rendering traffic between East Prussia and the rest of Germany difficult in any way. The Polish Government have, therefore, despite numerous changes which taken place during the last few years (e.g. transfer of payments) not only raised no difficulties with regard to preferential through railway traffic, but have also considered German interest when effecting the clearing in connection with this transit.

Starting from these considerations, the Polish Government are prepared to investigate, conjointly with the German Government, the possibilities for further simplification and facilitation of rail and motor traffic between East Prussia and the rest of Germany, in order to save German travellers using these routes unnecessary inconvenience. Technical experts could undertake to work out proposals for the realization of the above-mentioned aim.

All concessions on the part of Poland however, can only be made within the scope of Polish sovereignty, there can, therefore, be no question of extra-territoriality in connection with lines of communication. With this proviso, the Polish Government intend to meet Germany's wishes as far as possible.

(b) As far as the Free City of Danzig is concerned, it may be called to mind that the Polish Government have realized for some time the necessity of reaching an agreement on this matter by way of an understanding between Warsaw and Berlin, and have brought forward suggestions accordingly. This appeared to them especially appropriate considering the position of the League of

Suite exhibit 162 d.

H0788 - 0038

Nations, which is no longer able wholly to fulfil the obligations it has assumed in regard to the Free City of Danzig.

From the Polish-German conversations to date, it appears that there has been no difference of opinion about the fundamental conception that the Polish Government do not intend to restrict the free life of the German population within the Free City, and that, on the other hand, the German Government respect the rights of Poland her economic and maritime interests as well as those connected with traffic and communications . also, the rights of the Polish population in the Free City. As these two questions are of a fundamental nature, the Polish Government believe that a solution might be reached on the basis of a common Polish-German guarantee for the Free City of Danzig. On the one hand, this guarantee would assure free development of the German cultural and civic life of Danzig and on the other hand would safeguard Polish rights and interests. Incidentally, the Polish interest coincide with the economic interests of the population of the Free City whose welfare has depended on Polish over-sea trade for centuries.

Instead of mooting the previously mentioned problem of traffic facilities, which the Polish Government believe to be mainly of a technical nature, and a matter for experts, the Polish and the German Governments should begin their negociations about the Free City by discussing political principles. These discussions should follow such lines that, in accordance with the suggestions made by the German Chancellor in February 1938, the Poles would

H0788 - 0039

respect national conditions in the Free City, whereas the Free City and Germany would respect the rights and intere of Poland.

With a view to stabilizing conditions in this par of Europe, the Polish Government think it desirable that arrangements be made as soon as possible for an exchange of ideas on these two problems, which could be treated jointly, so that a basis might be found for a future con solidation of neighbourly relations between the two countries.

Certified true copy,
Signed : Dr Martin Horn
Attorney at law.

Suite exhibit 162 f.

H0788-0040

Ri-Exhibit No 163.

COPY 335

from the White-paper No 2 : Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of war.

No 209

Conversation of the German Foreign Minister With the Polish Ambassador, March 27, 1939.

Memorandum of Dr. Schmidt, Minister Plenipotentiary.

(Translation)

The German Foreign, Minister called the Polish Ambassador to account for the outrages in Bromberg, and remarked that these new excesses had created a disastrous impression in Germany, since the prevailing opinion here was that they met with more or less toleration by the Polish authorities. Again the offenders had been the members of the West Marches Society, against whom Germany had already lodged so many previous complaints with Poland. In Germany people were of the opinion that the Polish Government were certainly in a position to prevent such incidents if they wanted to. The Foreign Minister most keenly regretted such a development in German-Polish relations, and stated emphatically that the German Government must hold the Polish Government fully responsible for such occurences.

The Polish Ambassador declared that he had no knowledge of the incidents mentioned, but promised to make immediate enquiries. He, too, regretted the excesses but explained them away by the state of tension prevailing in Poland at the time. Moreover, he promised, for

H0788-0041

3352

his part, to do anything in his power to prevent a repetition of such incidents.

Ri-Exhibit No 163 §Cont'd

H0788 - 0042

When the Polish Ambassador asserted that similar incidents of an anti-Polish nature occured at German club meetings, the Foreign Minister at once replied that so far, provocation had always come exclusively from the Polish side.

To the Polish Ambassador's question as to whether it might not be advisable to address " a few re-assuring words to both nations " the Foreign Minister answered that kind would in any way meet the situation, for, as he had already said, the acts of provocation and press attacks had, so far come exclusively from the Polish side. If the German press now began to retaliate for Polish attacks (which he feared would soon be impossible to prevent) it would do so thoroughly.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could no possibly regard the proposal, submitted yesterda by the Polish Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of existing problems. The relations between the two countries were therefore becoming more and more critical.

When taking his leave the Polish Ambassador, for his part, promised to do everything in his power to overcome the difficulties.

Schmidt

A certified true copy.

Signed :

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at law.

Suite exhibit no 163 a.

H0788 – 0043

T r a n s c r i p t

337

Translation of document Nr.18 of the "Documents on the German-Polish relation and the outbreak of hostilities between England and Germany on the 3rd of September

1939.

The English-Polish publication of the 6 April 1939.

The negotiations with Mr. Beck comprised a wide field and have proved a full accord of both Governments in regard to certain general principles.

An agreement has been reached that both countries are prepared to conclude a treaty of permanent and mutual nature, which would replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance of his Majesty's Government to the Polish Government.

Until the conclusion of a permanent treaty Mr. Beck assured his Majesty's Government that the Polish Government considers itself bound in assisting his Majesty's Government under the same conditions as they were laid down in the temporary assurance, which was given to Poland by his Majesty's Government.

Just as the temporary assurance, the permanent treaty will not be directed against any third country, but it will be concluded in order to insure to Great Britain and Poland mutual assistance in case of a direct or indirect threat to their independence. Admittedly certain questions, including a clear definition of different cases in which the necessity of assistance might arise. should be further discussed before the conclusion of a permanent treaty.

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It has been considered as self-evident that the above mentioned arrangement should not hinder either of both Governments to conclude treaties with other countries in the general interest of strenthening the peace.

Copy certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law.

H0788 – 0045

"Exhibit Ri . No. 164"

338

From the White Paper Number 2

Documents concerning Events preceding the Outbreak of the War.

Remark to No. 459

Anglo-Polish Treaty for mutual assistance, 25 August 1939

In answer to a question asked by Mr. HARVEY, M. P., as to whether the obligations of mutual assistance contained in the British-Polish Agreement dated August 25, 1939, were to cover the case of aggression made by non-German Powers, including Russia, Mr. BUTLER, British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on October 19, 1939, made the following written reply: " No sir. During the negotiations which led up to the signature of the agreement, it was understood between the Polish Government and His Majesty's Government that the agreement should only cover the case of agression by Germany; and the Government confirm that this is so. "

A true certified copy.

Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at Law.

H0788 - 0046

Document TC 72

Copy

339

British Blue Book

Number 14.

GERMAN GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM OF 28 APRIL 1939, HANDED TO THE POLISH FOREIGN OFFICE BY THE GERMAN CHARGE D' AFFAIRES IN WARSAW.

The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two States being directly or indirectly threatened.

2. The German Government consider themselves obliged to communicate the following to the Polish Government: -

3. When in 1933 the National Socialist Government set about the reshaping of German policy, after Germany's departure from the League of Nations, their first object was to stabilize German-Polish relations on a new plane. The Chancellor of the German Reich and the late Marshal Pilsudski concurred in the decision to break with the political methods of the past and to enter, as regards the settlement of all questions affecting both States, on the path of direct understanding between them.

4. By means of the unconditional renunciation of the use of force, guarantees of peace were instituted in order to assist the two States in the difficult task of solving all political, economic and cultural problems by means of the just and equitable adjustment of mutual interests. These principles, contained in a binding form in the German-Polish Peace Declaration of the 26th January, 1934, had this aim in view (sic) and by their practical success were intended to introduce an entirely new phase of German-Polish relations. The political history of the last five years shows that they proved efficacious in practice for both nations. As recently as the 26th January of this year, on the fifth anniversary of the signature of the declaration , both sides publicly confirmed this fact, while emphasising their united will to maintain in the future their adhesion to the principles established in 1934.

5. The agreement which has now been conlcuded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British Agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance, which by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations is directed exclusively against Germany. From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government it appears that Poland intends in certain circumstances to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration.

H0788 - 0047

Document TC 72
(cont'd)
Number 14 340-41

6. The contradiction between the German-Polish Declaration and the Polish-British Agreement is, however, even more far-reaching in its importance than that. The 1934 declaration was to constitute a basis for the regulation of all differences arising between the two countries, independently of international complications and combinations, by means of direct discussion between Berlin and Warsaw, to the exclusion of external influences. Naturally, such a basis must rest on the mutual confidence of both parties and on the political loyalty of the intentions of one party with regard to the other.

7. The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third Power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this the German Government are obliged to conlcude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct friendly discussions with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 for the shaping of German-Polish relations.

8. The Polish Government cannot in this connexion appeal to the fact that the 1934 declaration was not to affect the obligations previously accepted by Poland and Germany in relation to third parties, and that the Treaty of Alliance between Poland and France maintained its value side by side with that declaration. The Polish-French Alliance already existed in 1934 when Poland and Germany proceeded to reorganize their relations. The German Government were able to accept this fact, since they were entitled to expect that the possible dangers of the Polish-French Alliance, dating from the period of the acutest German-Polish differences, would automatically lose more and more of their significance through the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and Poland. However, the entry of Poland into relations of alliance with Great Britain, which was effected five years after the publication of the declaraion of 1934, can for this reason in no way be compared politically with the still valid Polish-French Alliance. By this new alliance the Polish Government have subordinated themselves to a policy inaugurated from another, quarter aiming at the encirclement of Germany.

9. The German Government for their part have not given the least cause for such a change in Polish policy. Whenever opportunity offered, they have furnished the Polish Government, both publicly and in confidential conversations, with the most binding assurances that the friendly development of German-Polish relations is a fundamental aim of their foreign policy, and that, in their political decisions, they will always respect Poland's proper interests. Thus the action taken by Germany in March of this year with a view to the pacification of Central Europe did not, in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, disturb Polish interests in any way. This action led to the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which had constantly been described on Poland's side as an important political objective. Moreover, the German Government gave unequivocal expression to their readiness to discuss with the Polish Government in a friendly manner all problems which, in the Polish Government's opinion, might arise out of the changed conditions in Central Europe.

10. In an equally friendly spirit the German Government tried to regulate yet another question outstanding between Germany and Poland, namely, that of Danzig. The fact that this question required settlement had long been emphasised on the German side, and was not denied on the Polish side. For a long time past the German Government have endeavoured

H0788 – 0048

to convince the Polish Government that a solution was certainly possible which would be equitable to the interests of both parties and that the removal of this last obstacle would open a path for a political collaboration of Germany and Poland with the most favourable prospects. In this connexion the German Government did not confine themselves to allusions of a general nature, but in March of this year proposed to the Polish Government in a friendly form a settlement of this question on the following basis: –

11. The return of Danzig to the Reich. An extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia and the Reich. In exchange, the recognition by the Reich of the whole Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's western frontier; the conclusion of a nonaggression pact for twenty-five years; the maintenance of Poland's economic interests in Danzig and the settlement of the remaining economic and communications problems arising for Poland out of the uion of Danzig with the Reich. At the same time, the German Government expressed their readiness to respect Polish interests in ensuring the independence of Slovakia.

12. Nobody knowing conditions in Danzig and the Corridor and the problems connected therewith can deny, in judging the matter objectively, that this proposal constitutes the very minimum which must be demanded from the point of view of German interests, which cannot be renounced. The Polish Government, however, gave a reply which, although couched in the form of counter-proposals, showed in its essence an entire lack of comprehension for the German point of view and was equivalent merely to a rejection of the German proposals. The Polish Government proved that they did not consider their reply suitable for the initiation of friendly discussions by proceeding at the same time, in a manner as unexpected as it was drastic, to effect a partial mobilization of the Polish army on a large scale. By these entirely unjustified measures, the Polish Government demonstrated the meaning and object of the negotiations which they immediately afterwards entered upon with the British Government. The German Government do not consider it necessary to reply to the partial Polish mobilization by counter-measures of a military character. They cannot, however, disregard without a word the decisions recently taken by the Polish Government, and are forced, to their own regret, to declare as follows: –

(1) The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement, of the Danzig question, for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich, and thereby for a permanent strengthening of the friendly neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.

(2) At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another State, political obligations which are not compatible wither with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish Declaration of the 26th January, 1934. Thereby the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void.

H0788-0049

Document TC 72
(cont'd)
Number 14

244

13. In spite of this necessary statement of fact, the Government of the Reich do not intend to alter their fundamental attitude towards the question of the future of German-Polish relations. Should the Polish Government attach importance to a new settlement of these relations by means of a treaty, the German Government are ready to do this, but on one condition, namely, that such a settlement would have to consist of a clear obligation binding on both parties.

A certified true copy.

Dr. Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788 - 0050

Document T C 72

Copy

345 - 6

Translation of Document Number 16 of the "Documents concerning German - Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between England and Germany on 3 September 1939".

Memorandum communicated to the German Government by the Polish Government on May 5, 1939, in reply to the German Government memorandum of April 28, 1939.

(Translation)

As appears from the text of the Polish-German Declaration of the 26th January, 1934, and from the course of the negotiations which preceded its conclusion, this declaration had as its object to lay the foundations for a new framing of mutual relations based on the following two principles: -

(a) The renunciation of the use of force as between Poland and Germany, and

(b) The friendly settlement by means of free negotiations of any contentious questions which might arise in the relations between the two countries.

The Polish Government have always understood in this manner their obligations under the declaration, and it is in this spirit that they have always been prepared to conduct neighbourly relations with the German Reich.

2. The Polish Government had foreseen for several years that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a confused situation which it was in Poland's and Germany's interest to unravel. For several years the Polish Government had given the German Government to understand that frank conversations should be held on this subject. The German Government, however, avoided these and confined themselves to stating that Polish-German relations should not be exposed to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig. Moreover, the German Government more than once gave assurances to the Polish Government regarding the Free City of Danzig. It is sufficient here to quote the declaration made by the Chancellor of the Reich on the 20th February, 1938.

The Chancellor made publicly in the Reichstag the following declaration regarding Danzig: -

"The Polish State respects the national conditions in this State, and the Free City andGermany respect Polish rights. It has thus been possible to clear the way for an understanding which, while arising out of the question of Danzig, has to-day in spite of the efforts of certain disturbers of the peace succeeded in effectively purifying relations between Germany and Poland and has transformed them into sincere and friendly collaboration."

It was only after the events of September, 1938, that the German Government suggested the opening of Polish-German conversations regarding the alteration in the situation in Danzig and regarding the transit routes between the Reich and East Prussia. In this connexion the German memorandum of the 28th April, 1939, refers to the suggestion put forward by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation of the 21st March 1939, with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. In this conversation emphasis was laid on the German side on the necessity for a rapid settlement of these questions which was a condition of the Reich maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. The Polish Government, animated by the desire to maintain good relations with the Reich, although surprised at the pressing form in which these proposals were put forward, and by the circumstances in which they were advanced, did not refuse conversations although they considered the German demands thus couched to be unacceptable.

In order to facilitate endeavours to reach an amicable solution of the question, the Polish Government on the 26th March, 1939, formulated their point of view in writing to the German Government, stating that they attached full importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with the German Reich. The Polish point of view was summarised in the

H0788-0051

347 - 8

following points: -

(a) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate character of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which was to be based on complete freedom of the local population in internal affairs and on the assurance of respect for Polish rights and interests.

(b) The Polish Government were prepared to examine together with the German Government any further simplifications for persons in transit as well as the technical facilitating of railway and motor transit between the German Reich and East Prussia. The Polish Government were inspired by the idea of giving every possible facility which would permit the citizens of the Reich to travel in transit across Polish territory, if possible without any hindrances. The Polish Government emphasised that their intention was to secure the most liberal treatment possible of the German desiderata in this respect with the sole reservation that Poland could not give up her sovereignty over the belt of territory through which the transit routes would run. Finally, the Polish Government indicated that their attitude in the question of facilitating communications across Pomerania depended on the attitude of the Reich regarding the Free City of Danzig.

In formulating the above proposals the Polish Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 which, by providing the direct exchanges of views on questions of interest to both countries, authorised each State to formulate its point of view in the course of negotiations.

The Polish Government received no formal reply to their counter-proposals for a month, and it was only on the 28th April, 1939, that they learnt from the Chancellor's speech and from the German Government's memorandum that the mere fact of the formulation of counter-proposals instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions.

It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland.

In this connexion it should be pointed out that the Polish Government were unable at that time to express an opinion regarding the Polish-German-Hungarian guarantee of the independence of Slovakia which was alluded to in a general way in the German memorandum and more precisely stated in the Chancellor's speech of the 28th April, 1939, since a proposal of this description and in this form had never been made to them before. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine how such guarantee could be reconciled with the political and military protectorate of the Reich over Slovakia which had been announced a few days previously before the German Reich formulated its proposals towards Poland.

3. The Polish Government cannot accept such an interpretation of the declaration of 1934 as would be equivalent to a renunciation of the right to conclude political agreements with third States and, consequently, almost a renunciation of independence in foreign policy. The policy of the German Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from the declaration as far as they themselves were concerned. The obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and the German-Slovak Agreement of March, 1939, are clear indications of such an interpretation by the German Government of the declaration of 1934. The Polish Government must here recall that in their relations with other States they give and require full reciprocity as being the only possible foundation of normal relations between States.

The Polish Government reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of April, 1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934.

H0788-0052

347-50

This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognised by the German Reich. The declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs clearly stated that both Governments have "decided to base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 27th August, 1928." Now the Pact of Paris, which constituted a general renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, just as the declaration of 1934 constituted such renunciation in bilateral Polish-German relations, contained the explicit reservation that "any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty." Germany accepted this principle in signing the Pact of Paris and re-affirmed it in the declaration of 1934, together with other principles of the Pact of Paris. It appears from this that the declaration of 1934 would cease to be binding on Poland should Germany have recourse to war in violation of the Pact of Paris. Poland's obligations arising out of the Polish-British understanding would come into operation in the event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain, and, consequently, in the very circumstances in which the declaration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris had ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany.

The German Government in making a complaint against the Polish Government for undertaking obligations to guarantee the independence of Great Britain and in regarding this as a violation by Poland of the declaration of 1934, ignore their own obligations towards Italy of which the Chancellor spoke on the 30th January, 1939, and in particular their obligations towards Slovakia contained in the agreement of the 18th and 23rd March, 1939. The German guarantees of Slovakia did not exclude Poland (sic), and, indeed, as appears from the provisions of the above agreement regarding the distribution of garrisons and military fortifications in Western Slovakia, were directed primarily against Poland.

4. It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the declaration of 1934 as not binding. The pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any possibility of denunciation during that time. It should be pointed out that the decision to regard the 1934 Declaration as not binding took place after the previous refusal of the German State to accept explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish guarantee with the 1934 Declaration, which it was the intention of the Polish Government to furnish to the representative of the Reich in Warsaw.

5. Although the Polish Government do not share the view of the German Government that the treaty of 1934 has been violated by Poland, nevertheless, should the German Government attach importance to the fresh regulation, by means of a treaty, of Polish-German relations on a good neighbourly basis, the Polish Government would be prepared to entertain suggestions of this kind with the reservation of their fundamental observations contained above in the present memorandum.

It is hereby certified that this a literal copy of the quotations from the documents mentioned, taken from the original.

(sgd.) M. HORN

Ri-Exhibit No. 165

COPY

351

From the White Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 349

The Foreign Office to the German Ambassador in Warsaw

Order

Berlin, March 27, 1939

According to a report from the German Passport Office at Bromberg, an anti-German demonstration organized by the notorious Polish West Marches Society and attended by about 10,000 persons took place at BBromberg at noon on March 26. From the participants came shouts such as: "Down with Hitler," "We want Danzig," "We want Koenigsberg."....

By Order

Bergmann

A certified true copy:

Dr. HORN

Attorney at Law

H0788-0053

H0788-0054

Ri-Exhibit No. 166

COPY 352

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 352

The German Ambassador in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

Telegram

(Translation)

Warsaw 1, March 30, 1939

Following the interview on the 28th inst. with Foreign Minister Beck in which I brought up the subject of the serious incidents which had taken place in Pommerellen, especially those at Liniewo and Bromberg, I today made emphatic representations in connection with the same matters to Vice-Minister Count Szembek. .....

Moltke

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0055

Ri-Exhibit No. 167

COPY

353

from the White-Paper No 2 : Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 358

The German Ambassador in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Warsaw, April 4, 1939

In the course of the past few days a public appeal has been issued calling expressly for the boycott of German trade and handicraft! The appeal is signed by ten different semi-military associations, and contains the following demands :

1. All Poles buying goods in German shops, or frequenting German public houses, shall have their names poste

2. No goods of German origin may be used in Polish households.

3. Housewives must not buy German farm produce offered for sale at the public market.

4. Poles must not subscribe to German newspapers and periodicals!

5. All Polish firms shall employ only Polish juvenile and adult workers!

6. State and municipal officials and workers, as also employees and workmen in private firms must, in their relations with persons of German nationality, use the Polis language exclusively.

7. All signs and advertisements in the German language must be removed.

H0788-0056

8. Poles must not deal with German banks.

9. Our aims are :

(a) To obtain a repeal of the law permitting Germans to acquire real estate and to hold licenses.

(b) To prevent all German firms from furnishing supplies of any sort to State, municipal, or other administrative bodies.

(c) To restrict the postal privileges granted to the German press and German publishing firms in Poland.

(d) To secure the prohibition of German films in Poland.

10. We demand the surrender of all superfluous German church. buildings.

11. We demand the abolition of the excessively many German schools in Poland, whether State or private schools.

A certified true copy
Dr Martin Horn
Attorney at Law

Ri-Exhibit No. 167 (Cont'd)

H0788-0057

355

COPY Ri-Exhibit No. 168

from the White-Paper No. 2 Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 359

The German Consul-General in Danzig

to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Danzig, April 13, 1939

In numerous communities in Pommerellen, near the Danzig frontier, anti-German outrages have greatly increased of late. The excitement among the German minority is steadily growing, with the result that around Easter a large number of minority Germans from Pommerellen (according to some reports, approximately one hundred persons) fled across the frontier to Danzig.....

von Janson

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0058

356

C O P Y Ri-Exhibit No.169

from the White-Paper No 2 :

Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of war

No. 362

The German Consul-General at Kattowitz

to the Foreign Office

report

(Translation)

Kattowitz, April 22, 1939

Systematic efforts to debase the German minority in the eyes of the population have recently become increasingly pronounced. In addition to propaganda noticeable in my district, obviously emanating from military quarters with the object of disparaging the strength and striking power of the German Army, the spread of reports regarding an alleged shortage of foodstuffs in Germany is worthy of note. This propaganda is accompanied by a colossal campaign of hate against everything German here. According to messages received, resolutions aiming at the destruction of the German minority in Upper Silesia are being carried at meetings of political associations. The result is the recent increase in vile outrages against individual Germans, in which Polish youth in particular plays a conspicuous part.

Nöldeke

a certified true copy
signed : Dr. Martin HORN
Attorney at law.

H0788-0059

C O P Y Ri-Exhibit No.170

from the White-Paper No 2 : 357

Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of war

No. 366

The German Consul at Lodz

to the Foreign Office

report

(Translation)

Lodz, May 8, 1939

The terror spread by the hate-inspired Polish population among the Germans in the Voivodeship of Lodz, in the form of numerous cases of assault and battery, often resulting in bodily injury, threats, insults, boycotts, damage to property, arrests, and chicanery of every conceivable kind, and last but not least, arson, continues unabated. The Polish population has the unmistakable intention of destroying the German minority unless this minority allows itself to be completely Polonized .....

Von Berchen

a certified true copy
signed :Dr. Martin HORN
Attorney at law.

H0788-0060

C O P Y Ri-Exhibit No 171

from the White-Paper No 2 : 358-9

Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of war

No 369

(Translation)

May 12, 1939

.... The position of the German minority has always been difficult.....

.... Anti-German elements frequently hinder, and in some cases, even prevent the use of our mother-tongue in the religious observances of minority-German Catholics, and the police afford these worshippers no protection. In the Protestant churches, especially the United Protestant Church in Upper Silesia and the Protestant Augsburgian Church, the Germans, although constituting the overwhelming majority of Protestant congregations, have been deprived of their privileges.....

.... The German minority is firmly convinced that the treatment meted out to them is contrary to the Constitution and in many cases to the intentions of the legislator.

In view of the responsibility which we owe to the Republic of Poland as well as to our minority we deem ourselves entitled and obliged to bring these matters to your personal notice, Mr President, and to appeal to you to secure for the German minority the rights to which they are entitled under the Constitution and to guarantee the impartial enforcement of the Law as laid down in the statutes

We are, &c.....
In the name of the German Minority

Senator Erwin Hasbach Dipl.-Ing. Rudolf Wiesner

a certified true copy signed : Dr. M. HORN Attorney at law.

H0788-0061

C O P Y Ri-Exhibit No 172

from the White-Paper No. 2 : 360

Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of war

NO. 370

The German Consul at Lodz

to the Foreign Office

report

(Translation)

Lodz, May 15, 1939

Very grave excesses which may be designated as a German pogrom, occurred last Saturday, May 13 and Sunday, May 14 in the town of Tomaschow-Mazowiecki (of some 42,000 inhabitants, of which some 3,000 are Germans) as a result of which numerous Germans have suffered complete financial ruin.....

....When the mob was sufficiently worked up,..... the crowd ..., commenced the systematic and complete demolition of all German shops and private dwellings. In a wild fury they destroyed nearly all Germans private property. The Germans, who were hunted like beasts, fled to the open country and did not return until day-break. Many were seriously injured, having been stabbed or beaten with sticks.....

Von Berchem

a certified true copy

signed : Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at law.

H0788-0062

C O P Y Ri-Exhibit No.173

from the White-Paper No 2 : 361

Documents on the events preceding the outbreak of war

No. 374

The German Ambassader in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

report

(Translation)

Warsaw, May 22, 1939

The tension of the last few weeks has had its repercussions on the German minority in Volhynia.....

....The seriousness of the position in which the Volhynia Germans find themselves is indicated by the fact that during the last few months illegal emigration to the Reich has considerably and steadily increased despite the long way to the frontier .....

Von Moltke

a certified true copy

signed :Dr. Martin HORN

Attorney at law.

H0788-0063

Ri-Exhibit No. 174

362

from the White-Paper No.2: Documents on the Events preceding the outbreak of war.

No. 380

No. 380 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the Foreign Office

Report Thorn, June 6, 1939

The measures taken by the Polish authorities against Germanism and German prosperity continue.....
Small wonder that the situation of the German minority here is desperate in consequence of these conditions and of the outrages, assaults, and acts of violence reported elsewhere. This desperation shows itself most clearly in the stream of emigrants, especially of illegal emigrants, which continues unabated.

It can well be understood that German landowners are in a state of utter despair owing to the continuous oppression, attacks, and violence suffered at the hands of the neighboring Poles. Often they cannot go to bed at night for fear of having not merely windows smashed, but farms set on fire. In this state of despair they forget everything and harbor only one wish: " Away from this hell and back to the Reich."

von Kuechler

A certificed true copy:

Dr. Martin Horn
Attorney at Law

H0788-0064

Ri-Exhibit No.175

COPY

363

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 385

The German Ambassador in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Warsaw, June 19, 1939

..... On Tuesday the 13th inst. Senator Hasback called upon the Premier once more, in another attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation. Immediately afterwards, the German minority recieved the heaviest blow [illegible] far, namely; the confiscation of the German House in Bromberg, the closing down and confiscation of the German House in Lodz, of the Evangelisches Vereinshaus in Posen, and the German House in Tarnowitz. Investigations are still going on concerning the extensive action aimed at the suspension of the activity of all organizations in Volhynia.....

In my previous reports I have pointed out again and again how difficult the position of Foreign Minister Beck has become during the past few months, and how the military circles have gained increasing influence on Polish foreign policy.....

von Moltke

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0065

Ri-Exhibit No 176

COPY

364

from the White-Paper No 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 391

The German Ambassador in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

Telegram

(Translation)

Warsaw, June 27, 1939

German counter-measures can by no means be expected to induce the Poles to refrain from further action possibly considered necessary by them....

In the present situation reprisals are, therefore, of no practical value whatever, they only blur the now perfectly clear picture of the Polish one-sided fight of destruction against the German minority.....

Moltke

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0066

Ri-Exhibit No. 177

COPY

365

from the White-Paper No.2 : Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 394

The German Ambassador in Warsaw

to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Warsaw, July 5, 1939

As I have repeatedly reported, the oppression of the German minority group in church matters has become more acute! As the German population are mainly Protestant Polish policy aims at paralyzing the organization of the German Protestant Church as far as possible. In this connection developments must be mentioned which have resulted in the dismissal from office of Parson Kleindienst from Volhynia, revered by all on account of his personal merits and unshakable faith. He was finally expelled from his native land in which his family had lived for more than two centuries.....

von Moltke

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0067

Ri-Exhibit No. 178

COPY

366

from the White-Paper No. 2, Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of war.

No 411

The German Consul General at Posen

to the Foreign Office.

(Translation)

Posen, August 15, 1939

The Theological College of the United Evangelical Church in Poland will be closed as from January 1, 1940, by a decree of the 11th inst., by the Minister for Religious Denominations and Public Education...

For the Consul-General

Matuschka

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law

H0788-0068

Ri-Exhibit No.179

Copy

367

from the White-Paper No.2. Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 412

The German Consul-General at Kattowitz

to the Foreign Office

Telegram

(Translation)

Kattowitz, August 16, 1939

Action announced by the Polish authorities in progress since August 14. Numerous houses searched and people arrested, especially in the circles of the Young German Party (Jungdeutsche Partei), the German People's League (Deutscher Volksbund), and the trade unions ; number arrested approximately 200. German newspapers, trade unions, etc., closed down ; frontier almost completely closed. Action against fugitives still continues. Guards and armaments along the frontier increased.

Moldeke

A certified true copy

Dr Martin Horn

Attorney at Law.

H0788-0069

Ri-Exhibit No 180

C O P Y

368

From the White-Paper No 2. Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 415

No. 415 Memorandum of an Official in the Political Department of the Foreign Office

(Translation)

Berlin, August 20, 1939

During the last few months the German Foreign Office has continually received reports from the German Consulate in Poland about the cruel maltreatment to which members of the German minority are subjected by the Poles who have been more and more lashed to fury and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In the Appendix, thirty-eight especially grave cases have been collected, in which the remarkable similarity of method is to be noticed with which the assaults on minority Germans are staged....

Bergmann

a certified true copy
Dr Martin Horn
attorney at law

H0788-0070

Ri-Exhibit No 181

COPY

369

From the White-Paper No 2. Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No 430

No 430 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the Foreign Office

Report

(Translation)

Thorn, July 11, 1939

The climax of this year's festivities was reached in a demonstration at Gdynia on last June 29, in which Deputy-Premier Kwiatkawski, M. Roman, Minister for Trade and Commerce, and Minister Raczkiewicz, Voivode of Pommerellen, took part. According to a report by the German Consulate at Gdynia this demonstration was attended by some three thousand Poles from Danzig, who carried with them placards bearing the inscriptions, "The heart of Danzig and the heart of Poland are one," and "Danzig is Polish and will remain Polish." In an address, M. Budzynski, the representative of the Polish minority in the Danzig Diet, referred to the alleged persecution of the Polish minority in Danzig and declared that the Polish population of Danzig would achieve the union of Danzig with the Polish mother-country

H0788-0071

with the aid of the Polish army.

369a

For the Consul-General

Graf

a certified true copy
Dr Martin Horn
attorney at law

Ri-Exhibit No 181-(suite)

H0788-0072

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 182

370

Copy

taken from the White - Book Nr. 2

Documents on the history preceedin the war.

Nr. 272

The German Charge d'Affaires in London to the Foreign Office.

Telegram

London, 20 March 1939

The declarations just made by Chamberlain and Halifax in the Lower House do not yet clarify the intentions of the British Government Lord Halifax limits himself to a partially bitter presentation of the events of the last days. He spoke of "more far-reaching mutual guarantiqs" which might be useful. The communications at hand of reliable persons present roughly the following picture of the present situation The British Government firmly maintains its position to initiate conferences. It desires to take the leading role in establishing the poli to be followed in order to avoid that other countries make conditiona declarations which would not achieve their purpose according to the British point of view. The British evidently think of establishing a demarkation line which would especially include Rumania and the transgression of which by an aggressor would constitute a case of war. The following countries are said to have been invited to participate in th question of guaranties: Russia, Poland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely est blished that Hungary was not approached and that it was up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Esthonia and Latvia; the same applies to Turkey with regard to Greece. There is still doubt about Bulgaria.

Kordt.

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-law.

H0788-0073

Ri.Exhibit Nc. 184

371

C o p y

taken from W h i t e - B o o k No. 2

Documents on the history preceeding the war.

Nr. 274

The German Charge d'Affaires in London to the Foreign Office

Telegram

London, 22 March 1939

From a reliable sources I have learnt the following about the contents of England's propositions made in Paris, Warsaw and Moscow:

The proposed declaration provides that in case of an feared aggressio the signatories to the declaration pledge themselves to consult immediate "to resist aggression".

So far, Poland hesitates to accept the English proposition. Moscow has not yet given an answer.

As a second step, England wants to propose consultations of the General Staffs to result in military agreements in case this declaration is accepted by the respective countries.

Kordt.

Copy certified by:

Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-law.

H0788-0074

Ri. Exhibit Nr. 185

C o p y

taken from W h i t e P a p e r Nr. 2 372

Documents on the history preceding the war.

Nr. 275

The German Charge d'Affaires in London to the Foreign Office

Telegram

London, 23 March 1939.

Communications at hand show clearly that the English plan of declarations, as reported in a previous telegram, consists of two parts:

The first part deals with a guaranty of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland

The second part aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggressior Military spokesmen are said to have informed the British Cabinet that Rumania because of her oil-wells, will definitely have to be protected against German military seizure.

A well informed local diplomat confirmed that up to the present Poland could not make up her mind to accept the British propositions. Not considerir the enormous mistrust against assistance on the part of Russia the decisive fact for this attitude was the consideration that the relations with Germany would become untenable and that England and France, in case of a German attack, would not be in a position to give Poland effective military assistar Under these circumstances it appears that in the Foreign Office the thought a conference is coming to the fore again. It is hoped that a four power conference could effectively exert pressure on Poland.

The opposition must not to be underrated which still exists in English conservative circles against Soviet Russia's participation in the planned system. From Chamberlain's statement just delivered in the Lower House

it can be concluded that in conservative party circles close to the Government, it is greatly feared that after the consolidation of the Eastern territory under German domination such a block would throw itself upon England with all its might.

375

Kordt

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law.

H0788-0075

Ri. Exhibit No.186

374

Copy

taken from White Paper No.2

Documents on the history preceding the war

No.276

The German Charge d'Affaires in Paris to the Foreign Office.

Telegram Paris, 24 March 1939

A great part of the Parisian Press reports a basically correct announcement of the that on the occasion of the visit President of France in London, Chamberlain, Halifax and Bonnet signed protocols or exchanged Aide-Memoires in which France and England pledged themselves to automatically give armed assistance to and protect the borders of Holland and Switzerland in case of an attack on these countries. The pact concluded thus confirms the oral agreements that were reached on 29 January in Paris between Bonnet and the local British Ambassador. The obligations thus assumed were to be the same or similar to those existing with respect to Belgium. "L'Europe nouvelle" in its issue of 18 March (S.301) reports on the January agreement that the commitments towards Holland were desired by England and those towards Switzerland by France.

Brauer

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney at law.

H0788-0076

H0788-0077

Ri. Exhibit No. 183

375

Copy

taken from the W h i t e - B o o k No. 2

No. 273

The German Envoy in Oslo to the Foreign Office

Report

Oslo, 21 March 1939

Foreign Minister Koht, who has returned on Monday after visiting Paris for several days where he has lectured at the Sorbonne, immediately took the opportunity to write a sharp protest in the earliest afternoon paper against the inflammatory reports of the French press accoording to which the German Government should have demanded of the Skandinavian Countries already 12 days ago to join Germany economicly, as well as politcally.

The Foreign Minister declared that he was not even in the least aware of it. Not even one word, not even a syllable could be found in the Foreign Office about it. That this was one of the usual rumors that were hatched and disseminated for various reasons. He could only say, as he did previously that every reason exists to take , in times such as now, all such press reports with the foremost skepticism. Koht emphasized again that no suc "pressure" which presumably was exerted 12 days ago by Germany had been felt as yet in the Norwegian Foreign Office.

Dr. Sahm

Copy certified by:

signed: Dr. Martin Horn

Attorney-at-Law.

H0788-0078

Exhibit Ri. No. 187

376

Copy

from: Documents of German Policy, Volume 7 I

(Dokumente der Deutschen Politik)

No. 13

Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy of 22 May 1939 .

The German Reich Chancellor and His Majesty the King of Italy and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia, feel that the time has come to reaffirm the close relationship and association existing between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy by a solemn pact.

Now that a safe bridge for mutual help and support has been created by a common border between Germany and Italy, established for all times, both governments renew their conviction about the policy the foundations and goals of which have already been agreed upon by them previously and which has proven itself for the furtherance of the interests of both countries as well as for the safeguarding of the peace in Europe.

Closely allied by the inner relationship of their ideologies and by the all-inclusive solidarity of their interests, the German and Italian peoples are resolved to act in the future as well side by side and with united strength for the safeguarding of their Living Space (Lebensraum) and for the retention of the peace.

By this method, pointed out to them by history, Germany and Italy want to serve - in a world of unrest and deterioration - to safeguard the foundations of European culture. In order to establish these foundations by Treaty, the following were appointed as Plenipotentiaries:

by the German Reich Chancellor: Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs Joachim von RIBBENTROP

His Majesty, the King of Italy, and Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia: The Minister for Foreign Affairs Count Geleazzo CIANO di Cortellazzo.

They have agreed, after exchange of their authorizations, found in good and proper order, on the following regulations:

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manner, also that the intentions in regard to the future were the same ones. If Italy and Germany were resolved together to resist every attack of the opponents with force of arms, then they also agreed completely on the other hand about the necessity to exert every effort in order to keep peace in Europe for a long time, if only to guarantee for their two countries the necessary time for the conclusion of the constructive work and the completion of military armaments. On our part the duration of this period has been set for three years, on the German side for four or five years. However this should not be construed to mean that after the expiration of this period Germany and Italy have the intentions to disturb world peace by threats and aggressive acts. On the contrary, their cooperation has as its aim the creation of a basis by which it shall be easier in the future to guarantee the peace and security of Europe which can only be concrete and real if the necessities of life for Germany and Italy are justifiedly considered and satisfied. In any case, the Reich Cabinet (Reichsregierung) agrees with us completely on the necessity not to bring up any questions which could cause new discussions, before the expiration of the above mentioned time limit. Under these suppositions and with the goal to formulate the common will of Germany and Italy for the formation of a united front against the encirclement policy, the imminent conclusion of an alliance has been announced in MILAN, the signing of which then took place in BERLIN on 22 May."

After the reception by the FUEHRER in his working room in the New Reich Chancellory, CIANO and RIBBENTROP issued statements in the Federal Council Chamber (Bundesratsaal) of the Foreign Office before German and foreign press representatives. RIBBENTROP made the following statement:

"The Rome-Berlin Axis already arisen years ago out of the common resistance of Germany and Italy against the carpetbaggers of the Status Quo of Versailles and out of the resolution of both states to create for

H0788-0080

the European continent a just peace, has repeatedly passed its baptism of fire. If therefore on this day, the German-Iralian pact of alliance just concluded two weeks ago in MILAN was signed in the Reich Capital by the Emmissary of the DUCE and the FUEHRER's Foreign Minister, then this does not mean a new era of Germany's and Italy's policy, but that the governments of the two countries thus draw a logical conclusion to an entirely natural development. The same aims of National Socialism and Fascism had to bring the peoples forcibly together in a continuously closer community of interests and in an increasingly deeper bond. Today's treaty, which announces in an extensive form the will of the two peoples to master their future together, therefore serves no other purpose than to establish before the world in documentary form what has already been for a long time a living, political reality.

Ever since Germany and Italy have thrown off the shackles of the Versailles and Geneva system and have built up their policy on the power of their newly constituted empires instead of ideologies, foreign to reality, the so-called democracies have doubled their efforts to bring the two powers back to a new dependency and lately to encircle them again. At the same time, one has tried on part of these countries again and again to play up the Axis powers against each other, even to demolish the Axis. Despite all disappointments, which the clear policy and the unshakeable comradeship of the powers presented to these democratic hatemongers, these politicians have again and again made wild speculation about a possible break of the Axis. This game was to cast deceit over the lack of their own positive political successes.

Against all these illusions and tricks, this new pact establishes the unbreakable solidarity of 150,000,000 people united under the uniquely historical leadership of Adolf HITLER and Benito MUSSOLINI, in a manner above all doubt and misinterpretation. While the encirclement policy of the democratic governments is directed either under cover or in the open against Germany and Italy, the new BERLIN-ROME pact threatens no one. While the pact policy of our opponents is an irresponsible play with war and war panic, while one attempts

H0788-0081

Article I.

The parties to the treaty shall remain in constant touch with each other in order to come to an understanding about all questions affecting all of their mutual interests or the entire European situation.

Article II.

In case the mutual interests of the parties to the treaty should be endangered by international events of any type whatsoever, they shall immediately enter into consultations about the measures to be taken for the guarantee of these interests.

If the security or other life interests of one of the parties to the treaty should be threatened from the outside, the other party to the treaty shall make available to the threatened party its full political and diplomatic support in order to remove this threat.

Article III.

If the situation should arise - against the wishes and hopes of the parties to the treaty - that one of them should become involved in war with another power or other powers, the other party to the treaty shall immediately step to its side as an ally and support it with all its military forces on land, on the sea and in the air.

Article IV.

In order to safeguard the execution of the duties of the alliance accepted in Article III in a given situation, the governments of the two parties to the treaty shall further increase their cooperation in the military field and the field of war economy.

In the same manner, both governments shall also inform each other continuously about other measures necessary for the practical execution of the regulations of this pact.

Both governments shall/create permanent committees for the purposes laid down in Articles I and II above which are subordinate to the direction of the two Foreign Ministers.

Article V.

The parties to the treaty bind themselves at this time already by obligation to conclude - in case of a common war, - an armistice and peace only in complete understanding with each other.

H0788-0082

Exhibit Ri. No. 187

380

Article VI.

The two parties to the treaty are conscious of the significance of their common relations to friendly powers. They are resolved to retain these relations in the future as well and to formulate them together according to their mutual interests by which they are tied to these powers.

Article VII.

This pact becomes effective immediately after signing. The two parties to the treaty agree to establish the first period of its validity to be ten years. They shall contact each other about prolongation of the validity of the pact in proper time before the expiration of this period.

To affirm this, the plenipotentiaries have signed this pact and affixed their seals.

Executed in two originals, in the German and Italian languages both of which have equal validity.

Berlin, 22 May 1939 – in the XVII th year of the Fascist Era.

Joachim Von RIBBENTROP Galeazzo CIANO

Count CIANO reports about this meeting in MILAN in his speech before the Fashist and Corporative Chamber in Rome on 16 December 1939

After he had described the Anglo-French encirclement efforts:

Thus day by day, the ring was completed which – according to the intention of its originators – was to enable the blockade of Germany in the East of Europe and of Italy in the Mediterranean and in the Balkans. Nothing was more natural than that Italy and Germany should get together for an exchange of opinions under these circumstances in order to clarify and establish the future formulation of their common policy. This exchange of opinions took place on 6 and 7 May in MILAN. The German Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself could determine that the situation is being judged in ROME and in BERLIN in exactly the same

H0788-0083

to instigate entire continents against each other by continuously more daring combinations, this new pact serves just for the guarantee of the peace against such dangerous threats.

While the aims of the encirclement policy are purely negative and serve for the retention of an old injustice in order to withhold from Germany and Italy the place to which they are entitled in the world, their proper share of the goods of this earth, the ideals of the orderly powers (Ordnungsmaechte) are positive and creative: they want peace, but a just peace in order to guarantee for their peoples and all of Europe and not least of all also to the World the blessings of a permanent and sound order.

The two governments are of the firm conviction that there is not one single political problem in Europe which could not be solved by peaceful methods with good will on all sides. However at the same time they are firmly resolved not to retreat one step before the threat of force, but to defend the living rights of their peoples with their entire power and all means at their disposal. No one in the world may doubt any longer the irrevocable and fateful solidarity of the Greater German Reich with the Italian Empire, nor may anyone misinterpret or shake it.

In the future, the combined strength of the two countries will oppose any violation of Italian or German rights. Every foot of German or Italian soil will from now on be defended by Italian and German soldiers together. Germany and Italy together form, together with their powerful and faithful friends in the whole world, a powerful and invincible block, which is ready to give everyone the hand of friendship, but also resolved to break every enemy with their combined strength.

A certified true copy

Nuernberg, March 1946

s/ M.HORN

H0788-0084

Ri-Exhibit No. 188

COPY

from the White-Paper No 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 432

381

The Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig

To the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig,
Mr. Arthur Greiser

Danzig, August 4, 1939

I learn that the local Danzig customs officials posted on the frontier between the Free City of Danzig and East Prussia have declared, in an unprecedented statement to the Polish customs officials, that the Danzig executives intend, from 7 o'clock a. m. on August 6 onwards, to oppose a certain number of Polish inspectors in the exercise of their normal duties, which functions are a part of the prerogatives of the Polish Government on the customs frontier. I am convinced that this act on the part of the local authorities depends either on a misunderstanding or on an erroneous interpretation of the instructions of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig.

I am fully convinced that you, Mr. President of the Senate, can have no doubt that this infringement of the fundamental rights of Poland will on no pretext whatever be tolerated by the Polish Government.

I await your answer by August 5 at 6 p. m. at the latest, with the assurance that you have given instructions cancelling the action of your subordinates.

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned action is one of a series which have taken place on the frontier, I am forced to warn you, Mr. President of the Senate, that all Polish customs inspectors have received the order to appear for duty in uniform and bearing arms, on August 6 of the current year and on subsequent days, at every point on the frontier which they consider necessary for examination of the customs. Every attempt made to hinder them in the exercise of thor duties, every attack or intervention on the part of the police will be regarded by the Polish Government as an act of violence against the officials of the Polish State in the pursuance of their duties.

If the above-mentioned illegal actions should take place, the Polish Government will take retaliatory measures without delay against the Free City, as the responsibility for them will rest entirely on the Senate of the Free City.

I hope to receive a satisfactory explanation before the above-mentioned date.

Chodacki

A certified true copy:

Dr. Marin HORN
Attorney at Law

H0788-0085

RRi-Exhibit No. 189

COPY

382

from the White-Paper No. 2: Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War.

No. 434

The President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig to the Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic

Danzig, August 7, 1939

Sir:

In reply to your two notes dated the 4th of this month, the second of which I received on August 5th, I must express my astonishment to you that you should make a completely unverified rumor a pretext for sending the Danzig Government a short-term ultimatum from the Polish Government, and thus in this time of political unrest conjure up unfounded danger which may result in inconceivable disaster. The sudden decree of the Polish Government that all Polish customs officials on duty are to appear in uniform and bearing arms, is a breach of the arrangement agreed upon, and can be understood only as an intentional provocation to bring about incidents and acts of violence of the most dangerous nature.

According to facts which I have since ascertained, and concerning which I immediately telephoned to you on Saturday morning, the 5th inst., no order announcing that the Danzig executives from August 6th at 7 a. m. onwards are to oppose a certain number of Polish inspectors in the exercise of their normal duties has been issued from an office, certainly not from any administrative quarter of the Customs Office of the Free City of Danzig.

I refer you further to my note of June 3rd of this year, in which I already carefully defined the relationship of the Danzig customs officials and the Polish customs inspectors on the frontier.

The Danzig Government protest with great energy against the threatened retaliations of the Polish Government which they regard as an absolutely inadmissible threat and the consequences of which will devolve on the Polish Government alone.

I have, etc. . . . . .

Greiser

A certified true copy:

Dr. Martin HORN
Attorney at Law

H0788-0086

Ri-Exhibit No.190

383

C O P Y

from the White-Paper No.2

Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War

No.445

Communication from the State Secretary at the Foreign Office to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires, August 9, 1939

(Translation)

The Reich Government have been greatly astonished to receive information of the note of the Polish Government to the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, in which a demand was made in the form of an ultimatum to revoke an alleged decree intended to hinder the Polish customs inspectors in the exercise of their normal duties (which decree, however, was based on unfounded rumors, and in reality had never been issued by the Senate of the Free City of Danzig). In case of a refusal, the Free City of Danzig was threatened with retaliatory measures.

The Reich Government see themselves obliged to point out to the Polish Government that the repetition of such a demand, in the form of an ultimatum, to the Free City of Danzig and the threat of retaliatory measures would lead to greater tension in the relationship between Germany and Poland, and that the responsibility of such consequences would devolv exclusively on the Polish Government, for the German Government herewith repudiates in advance all responsibility for th

The German Government further draw the attention of t Polish Government to the fact that the measures taken by the Polish Government to prevent the import of certain goods from the Free City of Danzig into Poland are likely to bring about

H0788-0087

serious economic loss to the population of Danzig. 383a

Should the Polish Government continue to support such measures, there would, in the opinion of the Reich Government be no choice left to the Free City of Danzig, as matters stan but to seek other export and, consequently, other import poss bilities.

a certified true copy
signed: Dr Martin HORN
Attorney at law.

Cont.Ri-Exhibit No.190

H0788-0088

Ri-Exhibit No.191

384

C O P Y

from the White-Paper No.2

Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War

No.447

The German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw to the Foreign Office

Telegram

(Translation)

Warsaw, August 11, 1939

In amplification of yesterday's telephone message in which I reported M. Arciszewski's communication to me, I advise you of the fact that M. Beck yesterday had asked the British and French Ambassadors to see him before Arciszewski received me. Obviously Beck preferred to get his allies' "placet" before he made his statement to us.

Mühlisch

A certified true copy
signed: Dr Martin HORN
Attorney at law.

H0788-0089

Ri-Exhibit No.192

385

C O P Y

from the White-Paper No.2

Documents on the Events preceding the Outbreak of War

No.446

Communication from the Under- Secretary of State at the Polis Foreign Ministry to the German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw, August 10, 1939

(Translation)

With the greatest surprise the Government of the Republic of Poland have taken note of the declaration given in Berlin on August 9, 1939, by the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office to the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Poland on the relations existing between Poland and the Free City of Danzig. The Polish Government, in fact, cannot perceive any legal foundation justifying Germany to interfere in the above mentioned relations.

Whatever discussions on the Danzig problem may have taken place between the Polish Government and the Government of the Reich, these had their foundation merely in the good will of the Government and did not arise out of any obligation whatsoever.

In reply to the aforesaid declaration of the Governm of the Reich, the Polish Government are compelled to point ou to the German Government that, as hitherto, they will in the future oppose by such means and measures as the Polish Govern ment alone consider adequate, any attempt made by the authori ties of the Free City of Danzig to jeopardize the rights and interests that Poland possesses in Danzig, on the basis of th

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3854

agreement to which she is a part, and that the Polish Government will consider as an aggressive act any possible intervention of the Government of the Reich which may endanger these rights and interests.

a certified true copy
signed: Dr Martin HOLN
Attorney at law.

Cont.Ri-Exhibit No.192

H0788-0091

Copy Doc. No. TC 77

386-7

II

Memorandum of the conversation between the Führer and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Count CIANO in the presence of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs at OBERSALZBERG on 12 August 1939.

At the beginning of the conversation the Fuehrer, with the aid of maps showed Count Ciano the present position of Germany from a military point of view. He particularly emphasised the German western fortifications. There were three break-through points on the Western side at which in earlier times the French, for geographical and strategical reasons, had always attempted a "break-through", but these points had now been protected with special care, so that a "break- through" was impossible at any of them. Moreover the western fortifications had been carried along the Luxembourg and Belgian frontiers to the borders of Holland so that a violation of the Belgian frontier would no longer bring any advantages to France, but would invoke the serious risk that Belgium, in order to defend her neutrality, and under pressure of the Flemish element in her population, would place herself on the German side. The one remaining possibility of attack was, theoretically, across the Netherlands. But, according to the view of the Fuehrer, the Dutch would defend their neutrality with energy because they knew that if they took part in a general war they would lose to Japan their almost undefended East-Asiatic colonies. Furthermore, in view of the countless rivers and canals, and of the possibility of flooding wide areas of the lowlands, the Netherlands offered very unsuitable territory as a starting-off point for a great army. Germany would obviously invade the Netherlands, in the event of a violation of Dutch neutrality and, owing to the very short distance of the German frontier from the Meuse, could reach this river within a few hours. Finally the Rhine, which in Holland was 1 - 1½ km wide, offered a natural protection against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of an attack on Germany would consist in a blockade by the British navy. In this connection it should be remembered that the great range of the latest German bombers brought the whole of England within their sphere of action and would allow them to attack the blockading ships from the air. There were no other possibilities of attacking Germany. The Scandinavian countries would doubtlessly remain neutral and they were certain that neither side would attack them because the occupation of countries as large as Norway and Sweden hardly came into consideration (it was not a practical question). Similarly Switzerland would certainly oppose to the uttermost any attempt on her neutrality.

In the East Germany had also erected strong defences. The Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various defense systems of East Prussia (KOENIGSBERG, HEILSBERG triangle, Border fortifications). On the other Reich borders (GRENZMARK, SILESIA), there are strong fortifications in progress, which especially at the Polish border facing Berlin were being built into an unimpregnable system of succeeding lines. At any rate, at a distance of only 150 km. from the Polish border the capital was very exposed to aerial attacks, especially since owing to its great size (28 km, north-south and 45 km. east-west) the city could be bombed from a great height (6-9000 m)without, however, having particular targets attacked, but still with a certainty that the bombs would fall somewhere within the city area.

Turning to the military position of the Western Powers the Fuehrer pointed again to the vulnerability of England from the air. British aircraft production had made progress, but protected measures against raids were still much in arrears. It was known that England had decided only in the previous Autumn upon the definite type of anti-aircraft gun, and the German experience of their own seven years of rearmament assured them

H0788-0092

388 - 9

that large scale production was possible only some long time after the selection of a prototype, so that no real anti-aircraft protection could come into existence in England for one or two years. Furthermore, London and all the large British cities and centres of industry suffered from the same disadvantage as Berlin in relation to Polish air attack; bombing can be carried out from a great height and out of range of English anti-aircraft guns with the complete certainty that the results would always be successful within the general target area.

At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colours. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France at the most two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of war the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defence of their own country. With regard to the position of France, the Fuehrer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland, (which would not take long) Germany would be in a position to assemble hundred divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Fuehrer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count CIANO showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence. At the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect. If, however, Poland were given assistence by the Western Powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminish In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different. Furthermore, it was necessary to consider the population of the Polish state: Out of 34, 000, 000 inhabitants, 1½ million were Germans, about 4 million were Jews and 9 million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number that the total population and as already said, their striking pow r was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.

Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia; this would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation. Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the false neutrals to be liquidated on after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. The Fuehrer had told the Prince Regent Paul on his visit to Germany that, with special relation to Italy, he should make a gesture showing that he sided politically with the Axis and thought of a closer connexi with the Axis and of the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations Prince Paul agreed with the latter proposal. The Prince Regent had recently been to London and had tried to reinsure himself with the Western Powers. He had thus taken the same line as Gafencu who had also been extremely reasonable during his visit to Germany and had repudiated an interest in the importance of the Western Democracies. It appeared that subsequently GAFENCU had taken up an opposite standpoint in England.

H0788-0093

Of the Balkan countries, the Axis could trust completely Bulgaria alone as to some extent a natural ally of Italy and Germany. Therefore Germany had supplied Bulgaria as far as possible with armaments and would continue to do so. Yugoslavia would remain neutral only as long as it was dangerous for her to come openly to the side of the Western Democracies. If matters took arturn for the worse for Germany and Italy, Yugoslavia would openly join the other side in the hope that she would then influence the course of events to take an official turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Roumania was afraid of Hungary and from the military point of view externally weak and internally corrupt. King Carol would certainly abandon his neutrality if he were compelled to do so. Hungary was friendly and Slovakia was under German influence with German garrisons in certain areas.

Coming back to the Danzig question., the Fuehrer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent, for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and north easterly direction of a German policy. The east and north-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time . immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions. In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Traffic amounted to about 40 % of the tonnage of HAMBURG. Danzig, a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German and the Fuehrer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over this.

Count Ciano in replying to the Fuehrer's statement first expre ssed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that in his opinion, the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce in view of his convictinn that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparation for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate conflict were unavoidable, the Duce as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time. Ciano then showed with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war, Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.

The Fuehrer commented that on this point there were differences of opinion. Her personally was absolutely certain, that the Western Democracies in the last resort would shrink from entering into a general war.

Count Ciano replied that he wished that the Fuehrer were right, but that he did not think so. In any case it was necessary to consider the most unfavourable case that is to say a general war. Since the Abyssinian war, Italy had lived in a perpetual state of war and therefore needed a breathing space. Ciano then gave figures to show how great the material effort of Italy had been in relation to the Spanish war.

H0788-0094

Doc. No. TC 77
(cont'd)

392-3

Italian supplies of raw material were completely exhausted. It is necessary to allow time for their replacement. The Italian war industries which were in exposed sites and must also be moved south for purposes of denfence. The Italian artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns, greatly needed modernisation. The long coast line and other exposed places were most insufficiently defended. The naval position was also most unfavourable. At present Italy could only provide two battleships to meet the eleven or twelve battleships of the combined British and French fleets, whereas, in a few years she would have eight more ships at her disposition. There the Fuehrer remarked that England and France, too, would possess additional battleships of 35000 and 40000 tons capacity. Ciano said that the long Italian coast was difficult to defend and that the Anglo-French fleets had many bases at their disposition and particularly in harbours of Greece.

Italy was especially vulnerable in her colonies although Libya was difficult to attack from Egypt, and the Italians might be able to reach Mersamatruh. On the other hand the position was very different in Tunis. The relation between the Italian-Arab and the French-Arab population there was 1-20, while the strength of the European troops was 1-5 to the disadvantage of Italy. Furthermore, the Italian fortifications on the side of the French frontier were completely insufficient and new pillboxes were needed.

Abyssinia was almost pacified as far as certain areas along the frontier merging with British territory were concerned. English gold and propaganda raised trouble upon the population. This pacification, however, was only superficial. In a general war it would suffice if a few English aeroplanes were to drop leaflets in Abyssinia maintaining that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would come back to cross the Abyssinia frontier. Furthermore, in the case of war Abyssinia would be completely cut off from Italy and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in the country would be completely uncertain. In a few days there would be an army of 4 to 5,000,000 men in Abyssiania able to advance successfully. In the case of war against the Sudan, Kenya and French Somaliland, the islands of the Dodecanese would be in a difficult position owing to the attitude of Turkey. Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years. Albania was a completely undeveloped country and could not for some years to come form a workable basis of operations against the Balkans, roads would have to be built and it would be necessary to exploit the mineral wealth, iron, copper, chrome and oil, after which a successful advance could be made to Salonika and other directions in the Balkans.

In the economic sphere Italy had plans of autarky which would take some years for realisation after which she would be in a position to endure a longer war without difficulties. An additional reason for the Duce's wish to postpone the conflict, was the question of the Italianns abroad who should be brought back to Italy according to plan. There were a million Italians in France from whom about 700.000 could be regarded as still belonging to Italy, the remaining 300,000, however, in the case of war with France would be used as hostages as was clear from the measures taken in France in September of the previous year.

Finally the Duce himself set great importance upon carrying through the Rome Exhibition in the year 1942 for which the large scale preparations had been made and from which in the economic sphere and particularly in the matter of foreign currencies favourable results were expected.

In addition to these considerations especially affecting Italy there were other factors of a general political kind tending to favour the postponement of a general war. According to the Duce's view the encirclement policy of the Western Democracies would certainly function at the

H0788-0095

present time but, after an interval of time, the points of difference and the fundamental lack of unity between the parties of the encirclement front would make themselves felt and the front would accordingly fall to pieces.

Finally the Duce was convinced that the present strong state of feeling in England and France would not last very much longer especially in France the union sacree would break up in party quarrels if sufficient time were allowed on the side of the Axis. At the moment the Axis itself was responsible for the fact that party differences had been set aside in the countries concerned.

The position of Japan would also be considerably strengthened after the expected conclusion of the China war in two years time, while the position of Roosevelt in America would be severely shaken after a period of external tranquility, so that he would not be elected to the presidency for a third time, whereas his election was certain if war broke out. Spain which had just secured a government friendly to the Axis Serano SUNNER, BEIGBEDER needed a period of rest after the Civil War but in two to three years time would be in fact a considerable factor on the side of the Axis, e.g. within two years Spain proposed to built four battelships of 35, 000 tons, the plans of which had recently been brought to Spain by a Italian General. This construction would take place at El Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany. This could be done through the publication of a communique which Ciano had already given to Ribbentrop (then follows the text of the proposed communique.) Ciano said that the Duce had in mind a proposal for an international conference. The Fuehrer declared that at a conference of powers, Russia could no longer be excluded from future meetings. In the German-Russian conversations, the Russians had made it clear with reference to Munich and other occasions, when they were excluded, that in future they would not submit to such treatment. In addition to the four great Powers and apart from Russia, Poland and Spain must also be summoned to a conference. That would mean , however, that Italy and Spain would be ranged against England, Frace, Russia and Poland, i.e. an unfavourable position. Ciano said that the Duce considered that the party would win at a conference which was ready in given circumstances to allow the conference to fail and take into account the eventuality of war as a result of failure. The Duce, however, given consideration to the Fuehrer's view /had and had turned down his proposal. He was in favour of a peaceful gesture on the part of Italy and Germany saying that the Western Powers were not really ready for war. These Powers, however, according to the conviction of the Duce, who obtained very valuable information about the Democracies, would certainly begin war at the present time if they were in any way driven into a corner by the Axis and saw no other way out. The proposed German-Italian gesture offered an honorable way out which the democracies would certainly use for avoiding war. Wide circles warned them against war and the position of this (anti-war) party would naturally be considered strengthened by a peaceful gesture. Poland, from which the Western Powers would certainly draw apart, would be isolated after a certain time and be ready to accept reasonable solutions to the outstanding difficulties.

The Fuehrer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorised forces.

H0788-0096

Doc. No. TC 77
(cont.)

396-7-8

From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.

Ciano asked how soon, according to the Fuehrer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Fuehrer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's: what solution the Fuehrer proposed? Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behaviour must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since up to the present the German proposals had been refused. The Fuehrer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favourable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connexion between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25 years pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia and even proposed to advance to Berlin. It was unendurable for a Great Power to tolerate a neighbour of such hostile disposition at 150 kilometers from its capital. The Fuehrer had therefore resolved to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum, the brutal ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, an attempt to starve out Danzig or the invasion of Poland within 48 hours and in this way to leave the problem. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would also mean an increase in strength. Ciano asked what action of this kind against Poland was to be expected because Italy must amply prepare herself for all eventualities. The Fuehrer answered that in the circumstances a move against Poland must be reckoned with at any minute.

During this exchange of conversation the Fuehrer was given a telegram from Moscow and a telegram from Tokio. The conversation was interrupted for a short time and Ciano was then told the text of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the despatch of a German political negotiator to Moscow. Ribbentrop added that the Russians were fully informed of the intentions of Germany with regard to Poland. He himself at the Fuehrer's order had informed the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the Fuehrer added that according to his opinion Russia would not be ready to take the chestnuts out of the fire for the Western Powers. Stalin's position would be endangered as much by a victorious as by a defeated Russian army. Russian interest was to extend her access to the Eastern Sea. Germany had nothing against this. On the other hand, Russia would never interfere on behalf of Poland whom she hated whole-heartedly. The sending of the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow had only one purpose, i.e. to conceal the catastrophic position of the political negotiations.

After a further consideration over the communique proposal the Fuehrer said that he would consider this proposal and Ciano's news about the general situation for, he therefore proposed that the discussions should be continued on the following day.

Salzburg, 12 August 1939

s./ SCHMIDT

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s./ M. HORN
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H0788-0097

Doc. No. TC 77
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399-400

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Office of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

Memorandem of a conversation between the Fuehrer and Count CIANO in presence of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs at OBERSALZBERG on 13 Aug 1939.

The Fuehrer said that since the last conversation, he had been considering the whole position. Ribbentrop had meanwhile told him that in the circumstances Ciano had decided not to conclude the conversations with a communique. The Fuehrer agreed with this decision. The door was therefore open, no-one was committed and no course was blocked.

The Fuehrer had also come to the conclusion, as he had said in a previous conversation, that the danger of delaying too long into the autumn was that Poland would be able to carry out its relatively limited aims. Danzig could be made to submit by slow pressure and the treaty position was extremely favourable to Poland. Danzig could be blockaded and slowly ruined or even starved out from the second half of September and particularly from the beginning of October. The Poles could easily occupy the place. This occupation would be followed by a re-conquest of the Corridor and Danzig on the German side but any further military operations would be impossible at the present time of the year. Danzig therefore would fall into ruin, and the heavily motorized forces which were necessary for deep penetration into Poland could not be used. In a severe winter, it would be possible to undertake certain military operations, but the weather conditons would make the emergency landing places and the usual aerodromes unusable. If Germany used these aerodromes the flying distances would be much prolonged, more petrol would be consumed and a considerable less weight of bombs could be carried. It was therefore necessary that within the shortest time, Poland should clearly state her intentions, and no further provocation should be endured by Germany. If these provocations were just allowed to pass, the affair would be prolonged until October when tanks and aircraft could not be used. The Polish General Staff know these climatic conditions and their effect upon the German forces and therefore Poland was playing for time. The Fuehrer had therefore come to two definite conclusions, 1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack, 2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so. It should not be forgotten that the test of nerves which the Poles had begun by means of continual instances of provocation had not lasted for three months. Any sign of giving way would, in view of the Slav mentality, bring a violent reaction of over-confidence on the part of the Poles. Surrender would not, in any way strengthen the German position but would be regarded by every other country as a sign of weakness. If the Western Democracies had already decided to move against the Axis, they would not in any case wait for three or four years before carrying out their plan and attack only at a time when the Axis Powers had completed their necessary preparations, but they would pass the earlier conflict. If, however, they had not yet come to a decision in the matter (and the Fuehrer thought that in the state of their armaments they had not come to this decision). the best way of preventing them would be to deal with the Polish matter quickly. In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners, not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only strengthened Italian local interests but had also reinforced her general position, the same was the case with German actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Here also not only had German local interest been strengthened but the

H0788-0098

401-2

general position had been re-inforced. The Axis had thereby won considerable victories. If one were to consider what would have happened if these individual operations had not been successful and to ask what the position of Germany would then have been, one reached a similar conclusion. The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers. As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not exist further in the world through lack of space, not only was there no more space but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possesso they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to ru the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself on the "Conte Cavour" had summed up the position to him-in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Fuehrer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in theMediterranean. Bismarck had recognized it and had said as much in his wellknown letter to Mazzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them. Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and German would have their backs free for work against the west. The Fuehrer said that Poland must be struck down so that for years she was incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could be settled. Ciano thanked the Fuehrer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Fuehrer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localized on the basis of long experience. He (Ciano) quite saw that so far the Fuehrer had always been right in his judgement of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution and therefore Ciano would put the following question: -

The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland 1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation and 2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions did not depend on the decision of the Fuehrer but could take place at any time, and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realized that this date depended upon climat conditions.

The Fuehrer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another 14 days to 4 weeks, it could be finished by the end of September or the beginni of October. It followed therefore that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August. Finally the Fuehrer assured Ciano that since his youth, he had favoured German-Italian co-operation and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought

H0788-0099

Doc. No. TC 77
(cont'd)

403

that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration since there were no conflicts of interests between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce, for better or worse.

Salzburg, 13 September 1939

t./ SCHMIDT

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s./ M. HORN

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Attorney at Law